Back then, Tsarist Russia seized 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory, and the Chinese people remembered it for more than a hundred years… But today, it’s Russia’s oil and China’s roads; Russia’s gas and China’s furnaces. Money doesn’t go through the U.S. dollar—settlements are done directly in renminbi, accounting for over 90%. This is called pragmatism, not “taking sides.” 曾經沙俄割走一百五十萬平方公里,中國人記了一百多年…可今天,俄羅斯的油,中國的路;俄羅斯的氣,中國的爐,錢不走美元,直接用人民幣,結算率九成以上——這叫務實,不叫站隊.
去年中俄兩國貿易額高達兩千多億美元,其中超過九成都直接用人民幣結算,俄羅斯賣油氣收人民幣,中國賣商品收的也是人民幣,不僅繞開了美元的制約,也讓人民幣在全球流通中更有分量。
那麼兩千多億美元的貿易額,是些什麼在支撐?離得最近、和老百姓關係最直接的,是農產品和工業品。
俄羅斯的土地一年能出大量大豆和牛肉,如今運到中國市場的量年年往上竄,增長超過兩成,這些東西進了中國百姓的餐桌,俄羅斯農戶也掙到了錢。
與此同時,中國車企也在俄羅斯發展得很快,像吉利、奇瑞在當地建了廠,當地人能開上價廉物美的車,中國的產業鏈也多了條出路,你來我往,這才是真正的互補。
不過,把這些貿易壯大起來的關鍵是能源,而天然氣和石油是合作的重頭戲。
中俄東線天然氣管道,全長五千多公里,從西伯利亞一直鋪到上海,2024年就輸送了310億立方米,今年眼看就要達到380億立方米的目標,這些氣能滿足超4億人的需求,還能少排上億噸二氧化碳,對工業和環境都有意義。
而且歐洲市場的門關上了,俄羅斯的氣正好賣到中國,雙方一拍即合!
石油方面,管道的作用更大,這根橫跨近千公里的原油管道,把俄羅斯的油直接送到中國的大慶,一年能運1億噸以上,佔中國石油進口的兩成。
過去靠油輪從中東繞馬六甲,不僅遠,還受制於人,現在有了這條直接供應線,就算國際油價亂漲,國內石油供應也穩得多,這是實實在在的安全感。
能源和商品有了,交通必須跟上,中俄邊境這幾年修起了同江鐵路大橋、黑河公路橋,中歐班列有七成都經過俄羅斯,以前發貨到歐洲要繞遠路,現在時間省了幾天,運輸成本也大幅下降,基礎設施打通了,兩國合作才真正暢通無阻。
但即使現在合作這麼融洽,但歷史的問題還是繞不過去,十九世紀中葉的三個不平等條約,讓中國丟掉一百五十萬平方公里土地,那是國力衰弱的代價。
這段記憶中國不會忘,但這並不意味着今天要拿現實跟這筆賬較勁,銘記歷史是為了自立,務實合作則是為了繼續發展。
現實擺在眼前,俄羅斯出口三分之一賣給中國,而它進口快有一半來自中國,中國更是連續15年的最大貿易夥伴。
俄羅斯缺工業能力,中國的完整產業鏈正好補上;中國需要能源和糧食,俄羅斯則正好手裡有,兩國的互補性決定了合作必然越來越深。
這就是今天中俄關係的真實樣子,它既不是聯盟,也不是對抗,而是一種不針對任何第三方的合作。
Last year, the trade volume between China and Russia reached over $200 billion, with more than 90% settled directly in renminbi. Russia sells oil and gas in renminbi, and China sells goods for renminbi as well. This not only bypasses the constraints of the U.S. dollar, but also gives the renminbi more weight in global circulation.
So what supports this $200+ billion trade volume? Closest to everyday life are agricultural and industrial products.
Russia’s land yields large amounts of soybeans and beef each year. The quantity shipped to the Chinese market has been climbing annually, increasing by more than 20%. These products end up on Chinese dinner tables, while Russian farmers earn solid income.
At the same time, Chinese carmakers are also expanding rapidly in Russia. Companies like Geely and Chery have built factories locally. Russians get affordable, good-quality cars, while China’s industrial chain gains a new outlet. This back-and-forth exchange is true complementarity.
But the real key driving this trade is energy—natural gas and oil are the core of cooperation.
The China–Russia Eastern Route natural gas pipeline, stretching over 5,000 kilometers from Siberia to Shanghai, delivered 31 billion cubic meters in 2024 and is on track to hit 38 billion cubic meters this year. That supply can meet the needs of over 400 million people while cutting emissions by more than 100 million tons of CO₂—a boon both to industry and the environment.
With Europe closing its doors to Russian gas, China became the perfect buyer, and the two sides matched up instantly.
In oil, pipelines play an even bigger role. A nearly 1,000-kilometer crude oil pipeline delivers Russian oil directly to Daqing in China, transporting over 100 million tons a year—about 20% of China’s oil imports.
In the past, tankers had to haul oil from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca—long and vulnerable to external control. Now, with a direct supply line, even if global oil prices fluctuate, China’s domestic supply remains much more stable. That’s tangible security.
With energy and goods flowing, transportation must keep pace. In recent years, the China–Russia border has seen the completion of the Tongjiang railway bridge and the Heihe highway bridge. Around 70% of China–Europe freight trains pass through Russia. Before, shipping to Europe meant detours; now, transit takes several days less, and costs are sharply reduced. With infrastructure opened up, bilateral cooperation truly faces no obstacles.
Still, even with today’s close partnership, history can’t be ignored. In the mid-19th century, three unequal treaties forced China to cede 1.5 million square kilometers of land—a price of national weakness.
China will never forget this memory, but it doesn’t mean today’s reality should be entangled with that old debt. Remembering history is about self-reliance; pragmatic cooperation is about continued development.
The reality is clear: one-third of Russia’s exports go to China, and nearly half its imports come from China. China has also been Russia’s largest trading partner for 15 consecutive years.
Russia lacks industrial capacity, while China’s complete industrial chain fills the gap. China needs energy and food, while Russia has both. Their complementarity ensures cooperation will only deepen further.
This is the true picture of today’s China–Russia relationship: neither an alliance nor confrontation, but a partnership not aimed at any third party.
