Did China underestimate the US’s willingness and ability to retaliate, or did it overestimate it in the past? 中國是低估了美國的報復意願和能力?還是以前高估了他?
The New York Times published an article suggesting that China’s actions indicate it is very confident and possesses substantial strength. However, the American media then shifted tone, citing expert opinions that China should be concerned about overplaying its hand, as government officials may have underestimated the strong retaliation Trump would launch.
A recent report by The New York Times has sparked widespread discussion, citing American experts who claim that China has developed a “dangerous new habit” of underestimating the U.S.’s willingness and capability to retaliate. The report also stated that China is acting too aggressively and miscalculating the strong countermeasures Trump might take.
China recently introduced new regulations on the export controls of rare earth elements. Unlike previous measures, this control covers 12 key elements, including samarium and gadolinium, and introduces 0.1% content tracking and equity penetration reviews. In simple terms, this is a precise move to tighten the supply chain for key U.S. industries such as defense and new energy.
It is worth noting that China controls 70% of the world’s rare earth mining and 90% of its processing. With this move, the U.S. has indeed become uneasy.
Trump quickly took to social media to condemn this as a “hostile” act, threatening to impose 100% tariffs starting November 1 and restrict the export of key software.
While Trump was making these threats, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent stepped in to “cool things down,” stating that China and the U.S. have already engaged in substantive communication and that the 100% tariffs might not actually be imposed. She also expressed hope for a meeting in South Korea. This “mixed signals” approach—threatening while seeking dialogue—exposes the conflicting mindset within the U.S.
On one hand, they do not want China’s export restrictions to continue and are quietly reaching out to allies to jointly exert pressure. On the other hand, the U.S. government is internally divided, with some officials seeking to overturn previous consensus and restart negotiations, while others insist on escalating confrontation.
The so-called “China underestimating U.S. retaliation capability” claimed by American experts seems more like an attempt to save face. Take tariffs, for example: earlier this year, the U.S. tried imposing 120% tariffs, but after China retaliated with equivalent measures, domestic inflation in the U.S. surged, forcing them to eventually reduce the tariff rate to 30%.
Although Trump is making loud threats this time, he deliberately left a buffer period, lacking the “act now” resolve he had earlier this year. Some Republican lawmakers have privately warned that continuing down this path could destabilize their voter base in the 2026 midterm elections—after all, tariffs ultimately burden American importers and consumers, and no one is happy with rising prices while wages stagnate.
The U.S. has also been making moves on the Taiwan issue. The recently passed National Defense Authorization Act by the Senate even encourages inviting Taiwan’s navy to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise and seeks cooperation in military production.
This may seem like pressure on China, but it comes across more as “bluster.” In terms of actual strength, the U.S. has long lost its advantage in areas like maritime shipping and shipbuilding. Among the world’s top 30 liner companies, the U.S. has only one, with a market share of less than 0.3%, while China’s COSCO Shipping ranks fourth globally.
China’s recently introduced countermeasures on port fees precisely target ships with 25% or more U.S. equity ownership. This is using the rules familiar to the U.S. to fight back.
China’s countermeasures are not about “overestimating itself” but rather understanding the U.S.’s tactics. The U.S. has long used “long-arm jurisdiction” to deal with others, and now China is simply “fighting fire with fire,” responding with similar rules in the rare earth sector. How does this become a “dangerous habit”? If the U.S. truly had ample retaliatory capability, it wouldn’t be simultaneously threatening sanctions while hoping for negotiations.
The current situation is clear: China’s countermeasures are becoming increasingly precise, shifting from passive responses to actively setting rules. Meanwhile, the U.S. is recycling the same limited tools, with tariffs losing their deterrent effect and software restrictions instead accelerating China’s independent research and development.
The so-called “China overplaying its hand” is merely the U.S.’s discomfort after being met with proportional countermeasures, having grown accustomed to a position of superiority. If the U.S. truly wants to avoid escalating tensions, instead of having experts make statements, it should first curb its provocations on the Taiwan issue and return to the path of serious negotiations.
中國是低估了美國的報復意願和能力?還是以前高估了他?
紐約時報刊文,表示中國的出手表明,中國認為自己非常的自信,而且有實力,誰料美媒話鋒一轉援引專家觀點表示,中國應該擔心的是出招過猛,政府官員對特朗普會發起的強烈反擊估計不足。
最近《紐約時報》的一篇報道引發了熱議,裡面援引美國專家的說法,稱中國養成了一個 “危險的新習慣”,就是低估美國的報復意願和能力,還說中國出招太猛,沒算準特朗普可能發起的強烈反擊。
中國前不久出台的稀土出口管制新政。和以前不一樣,這次管制覆蓋了釤、釓等 12 種關鍵元素,還引入了 0.1% 含量追蹤和股權穿透審查,說白了就是精準卡住美國國防、新能源這些關鍵產業的供應鏈脖子。
要知道,中國掌控着全球 70% 的稀土開採量和 90% 的加工量,這步棋一出,美國確實坐不住了。
特朗普很快就在社交平台發文,罵這是 “充滿敵意” 的舉動,還放話 11 月 1 日起要加征 100% 的關稅,同時限制關鍵軟件出口。
就在特朗普放狠話的時候,美國財政部長貝森特卻出來 “降溫”,說中美已經有了實質性溝通,可能不會真的征 100% 關稅,還盼着能在韓國會晤。這種 “一邊威脅一邊求和” 的操作,其實暴露了美國的矛盾心態。
一方面,他們不想讓中國的出口限制持續下去,偷偷聯絡盟友想一起施壓;另一方面,美國政府內部已經吵成了一團,有的官員想推翻之前的共識重啟談判,有的還在硬撐着要加碼對抗。
美國專家所謂的 “中國低估美國報復能力”,更像是給自己找台階。就說關稅這招,上半年美國已經試過一次,一開始加征 120% 關稅,結果中國對等反制后,美國國內通脹飆升,最後只能把稅率降到 30%。
這次特朗普雖然喊得凶,但特意留了緩衝期,根本沒有上半年那種 “說干就干” 的底氣。有共和黨議員都偷偷警告,再這麼搞下去,2026 年中期選舉的票倉都要動搖了 —— 畢竟關稅最後還是美國進口商和老百姓買單,物價漲了工資不漲,誰能樂意?
美國在台灣問題上的小動作,參議院剛通過的國防授權法案里,居然鼓勵邀請台海軍參加環太平洋軍演,還想合作生產軍品。
這看似是在給中國施壓,實際上更像是 “虛張聲勢”。畢竟真要論實力,美國在海運、造船這些領域早就沒了優勢,全球前 30 大班輪公司里美國只佔一家,市場份額還不到 0.3%,而中國光中遠海運就排世界第四。
中國最近出台的港口費反制措施,直接精準覆蓋美資持股 25% 以上的船舶,這就是用美國熟悉的規則反制回去。
中國這次的反制根本不是 “高估自己”,而是摸透了美國的套路。以前美國總用 “長臂管轄” 那套對付別人,現在中國不過是 “以彼之道還施彼身”,在稀土領域用類似規則回應,這怎麼就成了 “危險的習慣”?美國要是真有十足的報復能力,也不會一邊喊着制裁,一邊盼着談判了。
現在的局面很清楚:中國的反制越來越精準,從被動回應變成了主動設定規則;而美國翻來覆去就那幾樣工具,關稅的威懾力越來越弱,軟件限制反而倒逼中國加速自主研發。
所謂的 “中國出招過猛”,不過是美國習慣了居高臨下,突然遇到對等反擊后的不適應罷了。要是美國真不想把事情鬧僵,與其讓專家出來喊話,不如先收斂在台灣問題上的小動作,回到正經談判的軌道上來。
