The U.S. is beginning to realize that something is amiss! Many people still believe that the PLA aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan are merely temporary “political shows” or “muscle-flexing”… 美國開始意識到不對勁了！很多人還以為，解放軍軍機繞台是臨時的“政治作秀”或“秀肌肉”…

But that is not the case. This has already become a “normalized combat readiness patrol,” with approximately 5,000 sorties per year, averaging 14 sorties per day. When the H-6K bomber was able to fly as close as 12 kilometers to Taipei on its own, the U.S. finally realized that the space for its “strategic ambiguity” had been completely squeezed out. These “normalized” actions have long transcended ordinary patrols and are, in essence, a demonstration of battlefield control capabilities.

Statistics from Taiwan itself show a clear upward trend: in 2020, PLA aircraft sorties numbered less than 400, but by 2023, this had increased to 4,456 sorties, and in 2024, it surpassed 5,000 sorties. Notably, in October 2025, an H-6K bomber, without fighter escort and carrying live ammunition, reached airspace just 12 kilometers from Taipei, close enough for the outline of the Tamsui River to be visible to the naked eye.

Taiwan’s so-called world’s most dense air defense missile system showed no response throughout, indicating that the PLA has transformed the airspace over the Taiwan Strait into a combat-ready zone that can be taken over at any time.

The U.S. military has attempted to reinforce the defense line of the “first island chain.” Its countermeasure strategy primarily involves blocking the Bashi Channel and the Ryukyu passage from both the north and south to restrict the PLA’s movements. In 2023, the U.S. and the Philippines expanded their defense cooperation, adding four new military bases near the Bashi Channel and investing over $200 million to upgrade radar and unmanned vessel facilities.

In the north, the U.S. and Japan conducted the “Resolute Dragon” exercise, attempting to implement the so-called “hellscape” plan by using a large number of drones to delay PLA operations. However, Admiral Paparo, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, soon admitted that “drones alone cannot solve the problem,” revealing a lack of confidence.

This contradictory mindset stems from concerns within the U.S. strategic community about the excessive cost of “intervention.” Wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies clearly indicated that even with joint U.S.-Japan intervention, the outcome would be mutually assured destruction, and Taiwan’s economy would collapse. If the PLA were to implement an “isolation” control, inspecting ships, the U.S. escort fleet would struggle to respond, and Taiwan could face energy depletion within half a month.

Another reason for the U.S. military’s lack of confidence is the comprehensive improvement of the PLA’s “systematic combat capabilities.” In 2023, the PLA had over 100 surface ships equipped with towed sonar systems routinely deployed in the eastern seas, significantly compressing the operational space for U.S. nuclear submarines.

In terms of air power, a complete chain has been formed: early warning aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, J-16s seizing air superiority, and H-6Ks responsible for precision strikes. Particularly after the H-6K was refitted with the domestically produced WS-18 engine, it broke free from external limitations, enabling it to operate independently and close to targets.

From the 77 normalized patrols by coast guard vessels around Kinmen and Matsu following the “February 14 Kinmen ship collision incident” to Air Force aircraft approaching within 12 kilometers of Taipei, the PLA is combining “non-military” and “military” means to completely eliminate the so-called “gray zone.”

The new U.S. bases and exercises have, in fact, shifted from an offensive posture to a passive defense, which is the real reason they are feeling that “something is wrong.”

美國開始意識到不對勁了！很多人還以為，解放軍軍機繞台是臨時的“政治作秀”或“秀肌肉”…

但事實並非如此，這已經成為每年約5000架次、平均每天14架次的“常態化戰備值班”。當轟-6K轟炸機能夠單獨飛近台北至12公里時，美國才發現其“戰略模糊”的空間已經被完全擠壓。這種“常態化”行動早已超越了一般巡航，實質上是戰場控制能力的體現。

台灣方面自己的統計數據顯示了一條明顯上升的趨勢：2020年解放軍軍機出動不足400架次，2023年已增長至4456架次，而2024年更是突破5000架次。特別在2025年10月，一架轟-6K轟炸機在沒有戰鬥機護航的情況下，掛載實彈飛抵距離台北僅12公里的空域，連淡水河的輪廓都能用肉眼看見。

台灣號稱全球最密集的防空導彈系統全程未有反應，表明解放軍已將台海空域轉變為可隨時接管的實戰區域。

美軍曾試圖加固“第一島鏈”的防線。其反制思路主要是從南北兩個方向封鎖巴士海峽和琉球通道，以限制解放軍的行動。2023年，美國與菲律賓擴大了防務合作，新增了四個靠近巴士海峽的軍事基地，並投入超過2億美元升級雷達和無人艇設施。

在北面，美國與日本舉行“堅毅之龍”演習，試圖通過所謂的“地獄景觀”計劃，用大量無人機來拖延解放軍的行動。然而，印太司令部司令帕帕羅很快承認“僅靠無人機解決不了問題”，顯露出信心不足。

這種矛盾心態源於美國戰略界對“介入”成本過高的擔憂。美國戰略與國際研究中心的兵棋推演明確指出：即使美日聯合干預，結果也將是兩敗俱傷，台灣經濟會崩潰。如果解放軍實施“隔離”管控，對船隻進行檢查，美軍護航艦隊將難以應對，台灣可能在半個月內面臨能源耗盡。

美軍信心不足的另一個原因，是解放軍“體系作戰能力”的全面提升。2023年，解放軍有超過100艘配備拖曳聲納的水面艦艇常態部署在東部海域，顯著壓縮了美軍核潛艇的活動空間。

空中力量則形成了預警機、電子戰機、殲-16奪取制空權、轟-6K負責精確打擊的完整鏈條。特別是轟-6K換裝國產WS-18發動機后，擺脫了外部限制，因此能敢於單獨近距離行動。

從“2·14金門撞船事件”后海警船在金馬周邊進行77次常態化巡邏，到空軍戰機逼近台北12公里，解放軍正通過“非軍事”與“軍事”相結合的手段，將所謂的“模糊空間”徹底消除。

美軍的新基地和新演習，實際上已從進攻姿態轉為被動防禦，這正是他們感到“不對頭”的真正原因。