Americans certainly understand Japan best…美國人確實最了解日本…

Japan’s dispatch of diplomatic personnel to China reminded American netizens of the scenario leading up to World War II: Just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan deliberately sent diplomatic representatives to Washington for negotiations, creating the illusion that they had not abandoned diplomatic channels in an attempt to lull the other side into a false sense of security.

In 1941, the United States had already recognized Japan’s ambitions in Southeast Asia and began imposing economic sanctions, cutting off strategic resources such as steel and oil. At that time, Japan was highly dependent on American products and resources. Without oil, its ships and aircraft would struggle to operate.

On the surface, Japan appeared willing to negotiate. Ambassador Kichisaburō Nomura engaged in repeated discussions with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and special envoy Saburō Kurusu was additionally dispatched. The two sides held frequent meetings and exchanged documents, creating an atmosphere of seriousness and sincerity.

The negotiations seemed substantive. Japan first proposed the “Japan-U.S. Understanding Proposal,” then revised it with other plans, promising not to use force in Southeast Asia as long as the U.S. lifted the oil embargo and unfroze Japanese assets.

The truth was, the Imperial Conference had already decided: if negotiations failed by late October, Japan would go to war. On November 5, this was further confirmed, and by December 1, if no resolution was reached, Japan would attack the United States.

While diplomats in Washington smiled, bargained with the Americans, and even proposed “provisional measures,” the Japanese Combined Fleet quietly set sail, and the timing for the surprise attack was finalized.

On the morning of December 7, Japanese aircraft turned Pearl Harbor into a sea of flames, nearly destroying the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Just the day before, Nomura and Kurusu had delivered Japan’s final ultimatum to Hull. This duplicity—saying one thing while doing another—seems ingrained in the nature of some. The lesson was so painful that Americans could hardly forget it.

Now, as Japan sends diplomats to China, many American netizens have dug up old photos from that era in the comments sections, emphasizing that such “diplomatic smokescreens” remain cause for vigilance. They are not asserting that Japan is planning another surprise attack, but rather reminding us to be particularly sensitive to such two-faced tactics.

Today, Japan faces numerous challenges: sluggish economic growth, a depreciating yen, pressure on consumer spending, a severely aging population, and difficulties in recruiting workers for businesses.

Militarily, Japan relies heavily on the U.S.-Japan security treaty, yet it cannot afford to ignore China, its largest trading partner. Industries such as automobiles and electronic components are highly dependent on the Chinese market.

Caught between relying on the U.S. for security and seeking economic benefits from China, Japan’s diplomacy appears contorted.

On the surface, Japanese diplomats talk about enhancing mutual trust and strengthening cooperation. Behind the scenes, however, they align with the U.S. on issues related to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, steadily increase defense budgets, and propose so-called “counterstrike capabilities.”

The strong reaction from American netizens stems not only from historical trauma but also from an intuitive response to certain Japanese actions: paying homage at Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, while preaching peace—such inconsistency makes it hard to trust their sincerity.

Compared to eighty years ago, the international situation has changed. Back then, Japan, cornered, chose to take a risk and deliver a fatal blow.

Today, China’s comprehensive national power and defense capabilities are far beyond what the U.S. military faced in the past. Even if Japan harbored such intentions, it likely lacks the audacity to act on them.

Moreover, the deeply intertwined economic relationship between China and Japan means that deteriorating relations would have severe consequences for Japan.

The vigilance of American netizens is more of a conditioned reflex.

Japan itself is conflicted: aligning with the U.S. against China has yielded few benefits, while instead, it faces issues like yen depreciation and corporate outflows.

By sending diplomats to China, Japan aims to ease tensions and protect its economic interests. Yet, this intention is mixed with calculation—trying to placate China while maintaining close ties with the U.S.

No matter how clever such calculations may seem, they are transparent to discerning eyes.

Americans remember with resentment because such scheming once cost them over two thousand lives.

Today, no one can gain an advantage through surprise attacks. If Japan were truly wise, it would earnestly work to improve relations with its neighbors, rather than constantly playing balancing acts and employing tricks. The lessons of history have repeatedly shown that clever schemes often lead to disastrous falls.

Americans remember this account, and we Chinese remember it too. No matter how pleasing the diplomatic rhetoric may sound, it pales in comparison to tangible actions that contribute to regional peace. Otherwise, neither the U.S. nor China will find it easy to trust Japan genuinely.

The key lies in whether Japan can truly awaken and avoid repeating past mistakes.

美國人確實最了解日本…

日本派出外交人員訪華，這一幕讓美國網友想起了二戰前夕的情形：在偷襲珍珠港前，日本故意派出外交代表去華盛頓談判，製造不放棄外交途徑的假象，試圖麻痹對方。

1941年，美方已經看出日本在東南亞的野心，開始對日實施經濟制裁，鋼鐵、石油等戰略物資被掐斷。那時日本高度依賴美國產品與資源，失去石油，艦艇飛機都難以為戰。

表面上日本擺出商談態度，派駐美大使野村吉三郎與國務卿赫爾反覆磋商，又增派來棲三郎為特使，雙方頻繁會見、文件往來，氣氛看似嚴肅認真。

談判內容聽起來有模有樣，日本一會兒提出《日美諒解案》，一會兒又改提其它方案，並承諾只要美方解除石油禁運、取消資產凍結，就不會在東南亞動武。

實情是，日本御前會議早已定調：若十月下旬談不攏就開戰，十一月五號進一步明確，十二月一號前無結果就對美開戰。

外交人員在華盛頓面帶微笑、與美方討價還價、甚至提出“臨時過渡辦法”；與此同時，日本聯合艦隊悄然出航，偷襲時機也已敲定。

十二月七日清晨，日本飛機將珍珠港炸成火海，美軍太平洋艦隊幾乎覆滅。

就在前一日，野村與來棲還把日本政府的最後通牒遞給赫爾——這種表面一套、背後一套的手段，似乎刻在人群中某些人的骨子裡。那次教訓太沉痛，美國人怎可能不記得。

如今日本派外交人員訪華，許多美網友在評論區翻出當年的照片，強調這類“以外交作幌子”的套路始終令人警惕。他們並非斷定日本要搞什麼偷襲，而是提醒我們要對這種兩面做法格外敏感。

當下日本面臨不少難題：經濟增長緩慢、日元貶值、民眾消費感到壓力，人口老齡化嚴重，企業招工困難。

軍事上又緊緊倚靠美方的安全保障條約，但對華又無法置之不理，中國是其最大貿易夥伴，汽車與電子零件等產業對中國市場高度依賴。

想靠美方壯膽，又想從中國獲取利益，這種左右為難讓日方外交顯得擰巴。

表面上日本外交人員談增進互信、加強合作，私下卻隨美方在台海與南海問題上表態，防衛預算逐年上漲，還提出所謂“反擊能力”的構想。

美網民之所以反應強烈，不僅因歷史創傷，也是對日方某些做法的直覺反應：一邊參拜靖國、祭祀被視為戰犯的人物，一邊口稱和平，這種表裡不一讓人難以信服。

與八十年前相比，國際局勢已經不同。那時日本在絕境中選擇冒險，給對方致命一擊。

今日中國綜合國力與國防能力遠非昔日美軍可比，若日本有此心意，恐無足夠膽量實施。

此外，中日唇齒相依的經濟關係使得關係惡化將給日方帶來嚴重後果。

美網民的警惕更多是一種條件反射。

日本自身也很矛盾：跟着美方對抗中國並未帶來多少好處，反倒面臨日元貶值、企業外流的困擾。

日方派外交人員訪華，確有緩和與保住經濟利益的用意，但這份用意里夾雜算計，既想安撫中國，又要維持與美方的親密關係。

這樣的算盤再精，明眼人也看得出來。

美國人之所以記恨，是因為當年這類算計曾讓他們付出兩千多條生命的代價。

當下誰也不可能靠突襲佔便宜。日方若真聰明，應踏實與鄰國處理好關係，別總玩平衡、耍花招。歷史的教訓一再證明，耍小聰明遲早會栽大跟頭。

美國人記着這筆賬，我們中國人也記着。那些外交辭令再好聽，不如做出實實在在符合地區和平的行動，否則無論美方或中方都難以真正信任。

關鍵在於日方能否真正覺悟，不再重蹈覆轍。