The New York Times: Are the Good Days Over for Taiwan’s TSMC? 紐約時報: 台灣省台積電的好日子到了盡頭?

The New York Times: Are the Good Days Over for Taiwan’s TSMC?

Starting today, if the 5-nanometer chips it produces are to be exported to the United States, approval from mainland China must first be obtained. The rare earth control order issued by China’s Ministry of Commerce has effectively placed Beijing’s stamp of approval on TSMC’s export licenses.

The entire process of modern chip manufacturing is inseparable from rare earth elements. From chemical mechanical polishing to core lithography and ion implantation, and subsequent etching and advanced packaging, every critical step relies on the support of rare earth elements.

TSMC consumes approximately 3,000 tons of rare earths annually, with 96% of the entire island of Taiwan’s rare earth imports coming from mainland China. The import volume in 2024 exceeded 6,000 tons, meaning TSMC’s rare earth supply is almost entirely dependent on “transfusions” from the mainland.

Even more critical is the “0.1% rule,” which directly restricts TSMC’s 5-nanometer chips. Analysis shows that TSMC requires lanthanum in the production of advanced 5-nanometer process chips, with lanthanum content in the chip materials about 0.5%, far exceeding the “0.1%” threshold.

In terms of regulations, these high-end chips must obtain mainland approval once they involve export. In the past, TSMC could leverage its position as the global foundry leader to navigate between China and the U.S., profiting from the mainland market while cooperating with the U.S. in blocking high-end chip exports to mainland China. Now, a single rare earth control order has completely disrupted its plans.

Some might think that importing rare earths from another country would suffice, but this idea is overly simplistic. Rare earths require not only mining sources but also separation and purification after extraction, necessitating a complete industrial chain. Mainland China is not only the largest producer but also dominates processing and separation technology, with most of the global refining capacity concentrated here.

Even if other countries have mines, they either have low grades and high mining costs or lack mature processing technology, making it extremely difficult to meet TSMC’s needs in the short term. Although Australia has mines, if the ore is shipped to mainland China for processing and then resold, the process still cannot bypass the mainland’s industrial chain.

Establishing a complete processing system from scratch would take at least five to six years and require massive investment. Even with ample funds, TSMC would struggle to endure such an ordeal.

TSMC once thrived by monopolizing high-end processes, with global tech giants vying for its foundry services. The 5-nanometer process is a major profit source, with flagship products from U.S. companies like Apple and Qualcomm deeply reliant on its capacity.

Now, the “nutrients” for this cash cow are being cut off. Without a stable rare earth supply, 5-nanometer production lines will be forced to reduce output or even shut down. Even if production勉强 continues, exports to the U.S. will depend on mainland China’s stance.

U.S. companies are frantic but helpless—after all, they can’t expect TSMC to make chips out of thin air. Once the rare earth control order takes effect, TSMC’s revenue will inevitably suffer. The 5-nanometer business is a high-profit segment with a significant share; if exports to the U.S. are restricted, this capacity will largely sit idle, and the前期 R&D and equipment costs will face huge losses.

U.S. clients won’t sit idly by either. If TSMC cannot supply in the long term, companies like Apple and Qualcomm will accelerate寻找替代 suppliers and invest in supporting other foundries, gradually eroding TSMC’s market advantage.

TSMC is now in a dilemma. If it confronts mainland China head-on, a rare earth cut-off would make it difficult to sustain high-end production lines. If it appeals to the U.S., the U.S. cannot solve the rare earth supply issue in the short term and is unlikely to rebuild an entire industrial chain for TSMC.

In the past, it could play both sides between China and the U.S. Now, with mainland China playing its rare earth trump card, the message is clear: to continue in the high-end chip business, one must follow the rules and cannot profit from the mainland while cooperating with external pressure.

This isn’t a sudden development. As a critical material for high-tech and defense, rare earths’ strategic importance has long been recognized internationally. Their unique electronic configuration makes them irreplaceable in magnetic materials, catalysts, optical materials, and other fields. Chip manufacturing, advanced weapons, satellites, and stealth technology all depend on them.

Mainland China’s move precisely leverages its absolute advantage in the rare earth industrial chain, offering a vivid lesson to those enterprises and countries attempting to choke its development.

TSMC once prided itself on technological leadership but overlooked the decisive role of basic materials. Without a stable rare earth supply, even the most sophisticated equipment could become scrap metal, and the most advanced processes would have nowhere to apply.

TSMC has now begun emergency communications seeking export permits from mainland China. How and how much approval is granted will depend on its subsequent actions. If it continues to cooperate with external technological blockades against mainland China, the rare earth supply tap may not be loosened. If it recognizes the situation and returns to fair cooperation without harming mainland interests, there is still room for negotiation.

In the future, TSMC must choose between compromise and resistance: compromise in exchange for rare earth supply and the mainland market, or resist and watch its high-end capacity shrink and be surpassed by others.

Whichever path it takes, it cannot return to the past dynamic of pleasing both sides and maximizing benefits. Ultimately, this is the consequence of earlier choices. In the face of absolute strategic resources, any technological monopoly appears fragile.

紐約時報: 台灣省台積電的好日子到了盡頭？

自今天起，它生產的5納米芯片，若要出口到美國，必須先徵得大陸同意。中國商務部出台的稀土管制令，直接在台積電的出口許可上蓋上了北京的印章。

現代芯片製造全過程都離不開稀土。從化學機械拋光、核心的光刻和離子注入，到後續的刻蝕與先進封裝，每一個關鍵環節都要靠稀土元素支撐。

台積電每年消耗稀土約3000噸，而台灣全島的稀土進口中有96%來自大陸，2024年進口量超過6000噸，這意味着台積電的稀土供應幾乎完全依賴大陸“輸血”。

更致命的是“0.1%規則”，直接把台積電的5納米芯片卡住。分析顯示，台積電在生產先進5納米製程時需用到鑭，鑭在芯片材料中的含量大約為0.5%，遠超“0.1%”門檻。

從規則上講，這些高端芯片一旦涉及出口，就必須獲得大陸批准。過去台積電能憑藉全球代工龍頭地位在中美之間周旋，一邊在大陸市場獲利，一邊配合美國對大陸高端芯片實施封鎖。如今一紙稀土管制令，徹底打亂了它的算盤。

有人會認為換個國家進口稀土就行，但這想法過於單純。稀土不僅需要礦源，開採后還得進行分離提純，需要完整的產業鏈。大陸不僅是最大生產國，還在加工分離技術上佔據主導，全球大部分精加工能力集中在這裡。

別國就算有礦，要麼品位低、開採成本高，要麼缺乏成熟加工技術，短期內滿足台積電需求難上加難。澳大利亞雖有礦，但若把礦石運到大陸加工再返銷，流程依然繞不開大陸產業鏈。

要另起爐灶建立一套完整的加工體系，至少需要五六年，而且投入巨大，台積電即便資金雄厚，也難以承受這種折騰。

台積電曾靠高端製程的壟斷地位風生水起，全球科技巨頭紛紛求其代工。5納米是它的重要利潤來源，蘋果、高通等美國公司旗艦產品深度依賴其產能。

現在，這棵搖錢樹的“養分”被掐住了。缺乏穩定稀土供應，5納米生產線將被迫減產甚至停擺。即便勉強生產，出口美國也要看大陸態度。

美國企業急得沒辦法，畢竟無法讓台積電用空氣造芯片。稀土管制令生效后，台積電營收必然受挫。5納米業務是利潤高地，佔比較大，若對美出口受限，這部分產能將大量閑置，前期投入的研發和設備成本將面臨巨大損失。

美國客戶也不會坐視不管。若台積電長期無法供貨，蘋果、高通等公司會加速尋找替代路線，投入扶持其他晶圓代工廠，台積電的市場優勢將被逐步侵蝕。

台積電此刻進退維谷。要與大陸硬碰硬，稀土一斷，高端產線難以為繼；要向美國申訴，美國也無法短期內解決稀土供應問題，不可能為台積電重建一整套產業鏈。

過去它能在中美之間左右逢源，今後大陸亮出稀土這張王牌，等於明確告知：要繼續做高端芯片生意，就得守規矩，不能一邊在大陸獲利、一邊配合外部施壓。

這事並非突發。稀土作為高科技與國防關鍵材料，其戰略地位早被國際社會認可。稀土獨特的電子構型，使其在磁性材料、催化劑、光學材料等領域不可替代，芯片製造、先進武器、衛星、隱身技術都離不開它。

大陸此次動作，是精準利用在稀土產業鏈上的絕對優勢，給那些試圖卡我方脖子的企業和國家上了生動的一課。

台積電曾以技術領先自恃，卻忽略了基礎材料的決定性作用。沒有穩定稀土供應，再精密的設備也可能淪為廢鐵，再先進的工藝也無處施展。

現在台積電已開始緊急溝通，尋求大陸的出口許可。許可如何批、批多少，要看它接下來的表現。如果繼續配合外部對大陸的技術封鎖，稀土供應口子恐怕難以放開；若認清形勢，回到公平合作軌道，不再損害大陸利益，仍有談判餘地。

未來台積電要在妥協與硬扛之間做出選擇：妥協則換取稀土供應與大陸市場；硬扛就只能眼看高端產能萎縮，被他人超越。

不論哪條路，都無法回到過去那種兩頭討好、利益最大化的局面。這一切，歸根結底，是當初抉擇的後果。在絕對的戰略資源面前，任何技術壟斷都顯得脆弱。