In the late Qing dynasty, there was a prince who, even before the dynasty collapsed, deposited £7.125 million—equivalent to more than 20 billion RMB today—into HSBC in Britain. 晚清有個王爺，大清還沒滅亡，就把712.5萬英鎊，相當於現在200多億存入了英國匯豐銀行…

At the time, this enormous sum shocked everyone. And the prince who secretly stored this fortune in HSBC was none other than the iron-cap prince Yikuang (Prince Qing).

This amount of money was enough to buy 200 of the most advanced ironclad warships, or to fund 20 years of border-defense military expenditures. Even more shocking was that this massive fortune was quietly moved overseas when—

the Qing imperial treasury’s entire annual income was only 280 million taels of silver. A single prince’s private wealth was worth nearly one-third of the national revenue. Behind this lay a staggering secret of late-Qing political corruption.

Yikuang’s accumulation of wealth began in 1903. When he took office as a Grand Minister of the Zongli Yamen, he opened a secret account at HSBC under the pretext of “handling foreign affairs.”

Unlike typical corrupt officials, Yikuang understood international rules. He avoided traditional Chinese money shops and chose a foreign bank instead. He also exploited the extraterritorial privileges granted to foreign powers under the Boxer Protocol, disguising his illicit assets as “railway bonds” and “customs guarantees.”

HSBC archives show that Yikuang’s account generated about £140,000 in annual interest, roughly equivalent to the cost of one cruiser for the Beiyang Fleet.

This cross-border asset transfer was not without risk. In 1904, censor Jiang Shiting impeached Yikuang for embezzling railway funds, but during the investigation HSBC refused to cooperate, citing “client privacy.”

Even more cunningly, Yikuang’s London real estate was registered under his steward’s name, and the interest earnings were remitted through a Swiss bank into the Tianjin concession. This “money-laundering chain” made it impossible for the Qing government to trace. Thus when the Wuchang Uprising broke out in 1911, Yikuang could still calmly use his overseas fortune.

Yikuang’s corruption network far surpassed that of Heshen. Within Prince Qing’s mansion, he kept four accounting books: sums above 10,000 taels went into the “Fortune Ledger,” above 5,000 taels went into the “Prosperity Ledger,” above 100 taels into the “Longevity Ledger,” and even the doorkeepers’ “gratitude money” was recorded separately.

In 1907, for his 70th birthday, he received 500,000 taels in cash. Gifts exceeded over one million taels, including a 100,000-tael banknote from Yuan Shikai and a famous courtesan, Yang Cuixi, offered by Duan Zhigui.

Most outrageous was the sale of official positions. A ministerial post at the Ministry of Posts and Communications cost 600,000 taels. Sheng Xuanhuai had to mortgage his family’s coal mines to buy it. A deputy circuit intendant post in Sichuan required a 3,000-tael “registration fee” and an arranged gambling loss to Yikuang’s son before one could take office.

This “marketized corruption” turned the Qing bureaucracy into a business arena. Even Manchu bannermen lamented: “Being an official is worse than running a pawnshop.”

Yikuang and Yuan Shikai’s relationship of mutual benefit was essentially a late-Qing “revolving door.” In 1903, when Yuan became Viceroy of Zhili, he gifted Yikuang a 100,000-tael banknote.

In 1908, for Yikuang’s 70th birthday, Yuan covered all expenses of the prince’s residence, even hosting the full-moon banquet for Yikuang’s grandson. In return, Yikuang used his influence in the Grand Council to ensure Yuan’s control over the six Beiyang divisions.

This transactional partnership peaked during the 1911 Revolution. When the Wuchang Uprising broke out, Yikuang immediately accepted a 3 million tael bribe from Yuan Shikai, then—along with Na Tong and Xu Shichang—pressured Empress Dowager Longyu to abdicate.

According to The Times, Yikuang once mocked openly to foreign reporters inside his Tianjin concession villa:

“The imperial jade seal of the Great Qing isn’t worth even one HSBC cheque.”

Yikuang’s secret deposits not only drained the treasury but triggered a chain reaction. After the scandal surfaced in 1911, provincial governors followed his example and began depositing local tax revenues into foreign banks.

The Viceroy of Liangguang, Zhang Mingqi, deposited 800,000 taels into HSBC; the Viceroy of Huguang, Ruicheng, transferred 500,000 taels. This directly caused military payrolls to run dry.

Ironically, Yikuang’s grandson Zaijun later used this inherited fortune to start a textile mill and became a major industrialist during the Republic, while the Qing’s “Self-Strengthening Movement” failed largely due to lack of funds.

This secret fortune also influenced international financial history. With Yikuang’s giant deposit, HSBC became the largest foreign bank in the Far East. The British government, by freezing Qing gold reserves in London, indirectly took part in economic plunder of China.

Historian Huang Renyu (Ray Huang) once remarked:

“Yikuang’s greed turned the fall of the Qing from a fiscal crisis into a collapse of trust.”

Yikuang’s case exposes a harsh truth: when power becomes a commodity, national decline becomes inevitable. His exploitation of Boxer Protocol loopholes to move assets overseas resembles modern cross-border money-laundering practices.

His “Prince Qing corruption network” is similar to today’s practices of “elegant bribery” and “shadow companies.” More telling is that Yikuang’s fall came not from honest officials, but from Yuan Shikai’s betrayal—once interest groups grow too powerful, they even devour their own creators.

In contrast, during the same period, Japan’s Meiji reformers like Itō Hirobumi harshly punished corruption and invested state revenue into railways and education. Meanwhile, the Qing’s “Prince Qing clique” hid silver in foreign vaults and eventually fled to foreign concessions with gold bars.

👉 This piece of history warns us: to govern a nation, one must first govern its officials. If parasites are allowed to eat away at the foundations of the state, even the greatest civilization will crumble.

When Yikuang died, his Tianjin concession mansion was still filled with treasures hauled from the Forbidden City. Yet those diamonds and antiques he once proudly showed off eventually ended up as trinkets on street stalls in turbulent times.

And as for that £7.125 million locked in HSBC’s vaults—after the fall of the Qing, it became dust of history. It neither preserved the Yikuang family’s wealth forever nor saved the collapsing dynasty.

👉 This story reminds later generations: a nation’s true strength never lies in the numbers inside a foreign vault. It lies in the trust of its people and in clean, just institutions. When power escapes all restraints, no amount of gold can buy lasting stability.

晚清有個王爺，大清還沒滅亡，就把712.5萬英鎊，相當於現在200多億存入了英國匯豐銀行…

這筆巨款在當時，足以顛覆所有人的認知。而這位在匯豐銀行存下這麼多錢的王爺，就是晚清的鐵帽子王：奕劻。

這筆錢，足夠買下200艘當時最先進的鐵甲艦，也能支付清廷20年的邊防軍費。更讓人吃驚的是，這筆巨款被秘密轉移到海外時。

大清國庫一年的收入才2.8億兩白銀，一個王爺的私人財產，竟然能抵得上全國財政收入的三分之一，這背後藏着晚清權力腐敗的驚天秘密。

奕劻的財富積累是從1903年開始的。那時候他剛接任總理衙門大臣，就以“處理洋務”的名義，在滙豐銀行開了秘密賬戶。

和普通貪官不一樣，奕劻很懂國際規則，他不選傳統錢莊，偏選外資銀行，還利用《辛丑條約》里列強享有的治外法權，把贓款偽裝成“鐵路債券”和“海關保證金”。

滙豐銀行的檔案顯示，奕劻的賬戶每年產生的利息大概有14萬英鎊，這相當於清廷北洋水師一艘巡洋艦的造價。

這種跨國轉移財產並非沒有破綻。1904年，御史蔣式瑆就彈劾過奕劻私吞鐵路經費，可調查的時候，滙豐銀行以“客戶隱私”為由拒絕配合。

更有意思的是，奕劻在倫敦的房產登記在管家名下，利息則通過瑞士銀行匯入天津租界。這種“洗錢鏈條”讓清廷根本查不到，所以1911年武昌起義的時候，奕劻還能從容地支配這筆巨款。

奕劻的貪腐體系比和珅厲害多了。他在慶王府設立了“四本賬冊”：萬兩以上的錢進“福”冊，五千兩的進“祿”冊，百兩的進“壽”冊，就連門房收的“孝敬錢”都要單獨記賬。

1907年他七十大壽時，光現金就收了50萬兩，收到的禮物價值超過百萬兩，其中有袁世凱送的10萬兩銀票，還有段芝貴獻上的歌妓楊翠喜。

最瘋狂的是“賣官”。郵傳部尚書這個職位標價60萬兩，盛宣懷為了得到這個職位，不得不抵押家族煤礦；四川候補道這個職位，得先付3萬兩“報名費”，再故意輸給奕劻的兒子幾萬兩才能上任。

這種“市場化的腐敗”讓清廷官場變成了生意場，連八旗子弟都感嘆：“當官還不如當鋪掌柜。”

奕劻和袁世凱的利益關係，堪稱晚清版的“政商旋轉門”。1903年袁世凱剛升任直隸總督，就給奕劻送了10萬兩銀票。

1908年奕劻七十歲生日，袁世凱包辦了王府所有開支，甚至還為奕劻的孫子辦了滿月宴。作為回報，奕劻在軍機處極力爭取，讓袁世凱牢牢掌控了北洋六鎮的兵權。

這種交易在辛亥革命時到了頂峰。1911年武昌起義爆發，奕劻第一時間收了袁世凱300萬兩賄款，然後聯合那桐、徐世昌逼迫隆裕太後退位。

據《泰晤士報》披露，奕劻在天津租界的豪宅里，曾當著外國記者的面嘲諷：“大清的玉璽，還抵不上滙豐的一張支票。”

奕劻的存款不僅掏空了國庫，還引發了連鎖反應。1911年存款的事曝光后，各省督撫紛紛效仿，把地方稅收存入外資銀行。

兩廣總督張鳴岐在滙豐存入80萬兩，湖廣總督瑞澂轉移了50萬兩，這直接導致清軍的軍餉斷供了。

更諷刺的是，奕劻的孫子載掄後來靠這筆遺產創辦了紗廠，成了民國紡織業的巨頭，而大清的“自強新政”卻因為資金不夠徹底失敗了。

這筆錢對國際金融史的影響也很大。滙豐銀行靠着奕劻的存款，成了遠東最大的外資銀行；英國政府則通過凍結清廷在倫敦的黃金儲備，變相參與了對中國的經濟掠奪。

歷史學家黃仁宇曾評價：“奕劻的貪婪，讓大清的滅亡從財政危機變成了信任崩塌。”

奕劻的例子揭示了一個殘酷的真相：當權力變成商品，國家必然會衰亡。他利用《辛丑條約》的漏洞轉移資產，就像現在的跨國資本洗錢。

他構建的“慶氏貪腐網絡”，和現在一些“雅賄”“影子公司”的套路差不多。更值得警惕的是，奕劻倒台不是因為清官彈劾，而是因為袁世凱的背叛——利益集團一旦失控，就連扶持它的人都會反過來咬一口。

對比同一時期日本的明治維新，伊藤博文等改革派嚴厲懲治貪腐，把國庫收入投入到鐵路、教育上。而大清的“慶親王們”卻把銀子藏在外國的保險庫里，最後只能帶着金條逃到租界。

👉這段歷史警示我們：治理國家首先要治理官吏，如果放任蛀蟲啃食國家根基，再輝煌的文明也會崩塌。

奕劻去世的時候，天津租界的慶王府里還堆滿了從紫禁城運來的珍寶，可那些曾經讓他引以為傲的鑽石、古董，在動蕩的年代里，最終成了街頭地攤上的貨品。

而滙豐銀行保險庫里那712.5萬英鎊存款，隨着大清的滅亡成了歷史塵埃——它們既沒讓奕劻家族永遠富貴，更沒能挽救清王朝的覆滅。

👉這段往事提醒後人：真正能讓國家強大的根本，從不在海外保險庫的數字里，而在民心向背和制度清明上。當權力失去約束，再多的黃金也換不來國家的長治久安。