In 2017, McDonald’s sold 80% of its China business to CITIC and Carlyle for US$2 billion. 2017年，麥當勞把中國業務的80%股份，以20億美元的價格賣給了中信和凱雷投資…

After the deal, CITIC took 52% as the major shareholder, Carlyle took 28%, and McDonald’s kept 20%.

Six years later, McDonald’s headquarters unexpectedly spent US$1.8 billion to buy back Carlyle’s 28% stake. Carlyle made an enormous profit from the deal.

Back in 2017, McDonald’s was in an awkward position in the Chinese market. Since opening its first store in Shenzhen in 1990, it had opened just over 2,400 stores in 27 years—mostly concentrated in prime locations of first- and second-tier cities.

At the time, local chain Wallace already had tens of thousands of stores, while McDonald’s still couldn’t break into lower-tier markets. It couldn’t connect well with local resources, had slow approval processes, didn’t understand local tastes—new products often didn’t sell—and when food delivery took off, slow decision-making made it miss the early opportunity.

Thus came the blockbuster equity deal: CITIC Capital and Carlyle jointly spent US$2.08 billion to acquire 80% of McDonald’s China.

Many foreign media outlets said McDonald’s was “bowing to the Chinese market,” but unexpectedly, this became the key turning point for foreign food-service brands localizing in China.

Chinese capital’s strengths quickly became clear—especially in decision-making efficiency. Previously, if McDonald’s China wanted to adjust a meal price, it had to report layer by layer to the U.S. headquarters—by the time approval came, the market had already changed.

After CITIC took control, it immediately restructured decision processes, giving the local team pricing and new-product development authority. For example, they launched a preserved-egg and lean-pork congee set tailored to local eating habits, and within three months it accounted for 30% of breakfast revenue.

Digitization upgrades gave McDonald’s a complete makeover. CITIC led the creation of a full delivery system. In 2017, delivery revenue surged 75%, and in 2018 it grew another 40%. Today, delivery has become McDonald’s China’s largest revenue source.

They also excelled in private-domain traffic operations. The membership system accumulated hundreds of millions of users, and member purchases now account for 67% of total sales—something McDonald’s could never dream of when it relied only on physical stores. Expansion into lower-tier markets unlocked massive growth.

Leveraging CITIC’s real-estate resources and government relationships in third- and fourth-tier cities, McDonald’s annual store openings jumped from 250 per year to 500.
By 2023, when Carlyle exited, the number of stores had more than doubled to 6,298, and is projected to exceed 7,100 by 2025.

Even more impressive: despite rapid expansion, 90% of stores remain directly operated, ensuring quality, with only 10% franchised—and those selected very carefully. The balance between scale and reputation is excellent.

Carlyle’s smooth exit reflects the true value of the Chinese market. It spent about US$580 million for a 28% stake in 2017 and sold it six years later for US$1.8 billion—an annualized return of 35%.

McDonald’s global headquarters was willing to buy it back at a high price because China has become its second-largest market and its major growth engine. No one wants to give up such a huge prize.

The new 2025 share structure is CITIC at 52% and McDonald’s global at 48%. This model—“Chinese control with foreign participation”—has become the new template for foreign F&B brands operating in China.

From KFC partnering with Primavera Capital, to Starbucks joining with Boyu Capital, to Burger King handing most of its China equity to CPE Yuanfeng, more and more foreign restaurant chains are choosing to work with Chinese capital.

This doesn’t mean foreign companies are weaker—it means the rules of the Chinese market have changed: understanding policy, having channels, and knowing how to operate locally have become the keys to foreign companies’ success in China.

Today, the Guanghua McDonald’s in Shenzhen is still packed. This first McDonald’s in China has witnessed 30 years of change. From being the symbol of “Western fast food,” it has become a “Golden Arches” empowered by Chinese capital.

The outcome of this equity game goes far beyond simple buying and selling. It proves that the Chinese market has never been a “cash machine” for foreign firms, but a “cooperation zone” that requires joint effort—and the Chinese capital that controls local resources has already become the most important leading force in this cooperation.

2017年，麥當勞把中國業務的80%股份，以20億美元的價格賣給了中信和凱雷投資…

交易後，中信拿了52%做大股東，凱雷拿了28%，麥當勞自己留了20%。

6年後，麥當勞總部竟然又花了18億美元，把凱雷手裡的28%股份買了回來，凱雷這筆買賣真是賺翻了。

回到2017年，麥當勞在中國市場有點尷尬。從1990年在深圳開第一家店算起，27年才開了2400多家店，而且大多集中在一二線城市的核心地段。

那時候，本土的華萊士都上萬店了，麥當勞卻打不開三四線市場，因為它對接本地資源不順暢，審批流程慢；不了解本地人的口味，新品老是賣不動；外賣興起時，因為決策慢錯失了先機。

於是就有了那次轟動的股權交易：中信資本和凱雷聯手，花了20.8億美元拿下了麥當勞中國80%的股份。

當時很多國外媒體說麥當勞是“向中國市場低頭”，但沒想到，這反而是外資餐飲在中國本土化轉型的關鍵點。

中國資本的本事很快就顯現出來，主要體現在決策效率上。以前麥當勞中國要調個套餐價格，得一層層報給美國總部，等批下來市場早就變了。

中信入主后，立刻調整了決策流程，讓本土團隊有了自己定價和研發新品的權力。比如，針對中國人的習慣推出了皮蛋瘦肉粥套餐，三個月內就佔了早餐收入的30%。

數字化升級更是讓麥當勞煥然一新。中信團隊主導建立了外賣系統，2017年外賣業務猛增75%，2018年又增長了40%。現在，外賣成了麥當勞中國最大的收入來源！

私域流量運營也做得特別好，會員系統積累了幾億用戶，這些會員貢獻的銷售額佔了總額的67%，這是以前只靠門店的麥當勞想都不敢想的。下沉市場的開拓徹底釋放了增長潛力。

藉助中信在三四線城市的地產資源和政府關係，麥當勞的開店速度從每年250家提高到了500家。
到2023年凱雷退出時，門店數翻了一倍多，達到6298家，預計2025年將超過7100家。

更厲害的是，雖然擴張快，但90%的店還是直營，保證品質，只有10%是嚴格挑選的加盟店，規模和口碑平衡得很好。

凱雷順利退場，其實就是中國市場價值的體現。2017年它花5.8億多美元買了28%的股份，6年後18億美元賣出，年化回報率高達35%。

麥當勞全球願意高價回購，是因為中國市場已經成了它的第二大市場和增長動力，誰都不想放過這塊大蛋糕。

2025年的新股權結構是中信佔52%，麥當勞全球佔48%。這種“中國控股、外資參與”的模式，成了外資餐飲在中國發展的新模板。

從肯德基和春華資本合作，到星巴克和博裕投資聯手，再到漢堡王把大部分股份交給CPE源峰，越來越多的外資餐飲選擇和中國資本合作。

這說明的不是外資變弱了，而是中國市場的規則變了：懂政策、有渠道、會運營的本土力量，已經成了外資在中國成功發展的關鍵。

現在深圳的光華餐廳依然人很多，這家中國第一家麥當勞見證了三十年的變化。它從最初的“外國快餐代表”，變成了被中國資本“賦能”的“金拱門”。

這場股權遊戲的結果已經超越了簡單的買賣。它證明：中國市場從來不是外資的“提款機”，而是需要大家一起努力的“合作地”，而掌握了本地資源的中國資本，已經成了這場合作中最重要的主導者。