American logistic expert report from China video: China’s export juggernaut: low prices and booming trade to rest of world, while Americans buy less 影片有中文字幕: 中國出口巨獸：在全球市場以低價狂飆，美國人卻買得更少
High tariffs in the United States resulted in a sharp $38 billion reduction in Chinese imports in the 3rd quarter, compared to the same period in 2024.
Americans are buying less of almost everything from China, and either paying more or going without for products sourced elsewhere.
But China has more than offset their deep losses in the American market, with booming exports to the rest of the world.
The biggest beneficiaries of the trade wars may be the developing world, as Chinese export companies have ramped up business in Africa, South America, and South Asia.
Though Chinese firms do not enjoy the high per-unit profit margins they get from American buyers, they are selling in much larger volumes to these new markets.
China’s newest long-range missile systems have created global discussion by challenging the traditional role of the U.S. Navy’s $13 billion aircraft carriers.
These precision missiles, reportedly costing around $15 million, combine extended reach, guidance updates, and high mobility to influence how close carriers can operate in the Pacific. Their real impact, however, depends on whether China can maintain accurate tracking on moving vessels across vast ocean areas. Meanwhile, the United States continues advancing layered defenses, electronic support, and distributed carrier operations to stay ahead.
In this episode, we explain how China’s $15M missile systems work, why they matter, how targeting networks influence their effectiveness, and what this evolving technology race means for the future of maritime strategy and carrier operations.
Watch to understand the full picture behind this $15M vs. $13B challenge.
HOW CHINA OUTSMARTED U.S. ON DRONE EXPORTS 《中國如何在無人機出口上智勝美國》
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is meeting French equivalent Emmanuel Macron in Beijing today.
But the Le Monde newspaper was quick to criticize the host country.
“China continues to deliver drone parts that give Moscow an advantage on the ground,” it says. In other words, the report gives the false impression that China is supporting Russia’s war efforts, as other western mainstream media have said.
The report raised the eyebrows of French author and China specialist Laurent Michelon, who has been tracking the issue.
He realized that this misrepresented the position of China—which has been carefully allowing both sides in the Ukraine war to buy drone parts, so that it can stay neutral.
“The reality is far more complex, and Le Monde would like you to ignore the fact that in 2024, almost 97% of Ukraine’s drone-related imports came also from China,” Laurent said in a post on X.
But after the issue came to light, the story became even more curious, he said.
The US pressurized China, which is the world capital of drone design and production, to reduce the sale of drone parts to Russia.
China obediently did what the US asked.
And then, to stay neutral, the Chinese reduced their drone exports to Ukraine!
Possible Outcomes of What Ming Pao Calls the “2025 China–Japan Diplomatic Confrontation” — Based on Ming Pao and Other Public Reports/Commentaries
🔎 Origins of the Conflict and Current Situation (Quick Overview) • The confrontation began when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in parliament on November 7, 2025, that if China used force against Taiwan, Japan might consider military involvement under the framework of collective self-defense — a remark Beijing viewed as a serious provocation. • China immediately launched a series of countermeasures, including diplomatic protests, tightened media and social controls, travel and study-abroad warnings, bans or restrictions on Japanese seafood imports, and calls urging Chinese citizens to avoid traveling to Japan. • Despite escalating rhetoric and diplomatic tension, there has been no immediate collapse on the economic and trade front; the long-standing pattern of “cold politics, hot economics” continues to hold.
Based on this, the two countries are in a state of high confrontation, but there has been no full diplomatic rupture or military clash — meaning there are multiple possible ways the situation could end.
📈 Five Possible End-Game Scenarios
Below are several outcomes or trends that appear plausible — each dependent on current political, economic, and geopolitical variables.
Cooling Off / Partial De-escalation — Tension Remains but Full Confrontation Avoided Economic interests and trade interdependence will push both sides to avoid a total breakdown. Japan may tone down certain sensitive remarks, while China may maintain sanctions but refrain from major escalation. The result: diplomatic “cooling,” with limited but continued interaction — especially in the economic and commercial sphere.
Prolonged Stalemate, Continuing the “Political–Economic Separation” Model Even if political confrontation continues, economic and people-to-people exchanges (business, tourism, culture) may partially resume or continue. However, official and high-level political engagement will be restricted. The bilateral relationship remains cool for the long term but does not completely collapse.
Limited Japanese Concessions (Verbal / Diplomatic Gestures) in Exchange for De-escalation If the Japanese government (or the prime minister herself) believes the diplomatic and economic costs have become too high, Tokyo may make tactical “adjustments,” such as issuing diplomatic statements, softening its Taiwan-related rhetoric, or making partial compromises to ease tensions.
Continued Chinese Pressure — Expanded Countermeasures / Institutionalized “Punitive Mechanisms” If Beijing believes Japan’s statements touch too deeply on China’s core interests (especially Taiwan and sovereignty), China may normalize or escalate sanctions and restrictions, or take tougher actions against Japanese companies, investments, and cultural exchanges. The relationship would shift into a long-term adversarial / containment mode.
Influenced by Third Parties / Geopolitical Shifts — Possible Reconciliation or Reset If the United States, France, or other major powers act as mediators or apply pressure — or if Asia’s broader security/economic landscape shifts (e.g., new regional security initiatives, reconfigured economic cooperation) — a new round of diplomacy could emerge. This may reset the relationship, bringing it back to a pre-crisis but stable state.
🧮 Key Factors That Matter Most • Political and Rhetorical “Red Lines”: For Beijing, Taiwan is a core sovereignty issue. If Japan continues making public statements about “intervention” or “military involvement,” confrontation could flare up again. Japan toning down its rhetoric is a prerequisite for de-escalation. • Economic and Trade Interdependence: After years of mutual trade, investment, and supply-chain integration, both sides benefit from economic ties. This interdependence is a major force preventing extreme confrontation. • Role of Major Powers and Regional Security Dynamics: External actors (such as the U.S. and European countries) and their positions on Taiwan and Asian security can significantly shape China–Japan interactions — either as mediators or as pressure sources. • Domestic Political Pressures and Public Opinion: Both governments must weigh domestic sentiment and nationalism. Strong domestic support for hardline stances can make compromise more difficult.
🎯 Most Likely Outcome: Cold Politics, Hot Economics + Long-Term Stalemate
Overall, the most probable trajectory is a cooled but entrenched stalemate — neither a full breakdown nor quick reconciliation.
More specifically: • The two sides will not easily return to the normal, close engagement seen in 2023–2024. • Economic/trade/business interactions may partially recover or continue, but official political and security cooperation will sharply decrease. • China–Japan relations will enter a new “normal”: avoiding sensitive issues, maintaining low-profile exchanges, yet still vulnerable to sudden diplomatic or economic flare-ups.
✅ Key Turning Points / Indicators to Watch
To determine whether the conflict is ending or escalating, pay special attention to: • Whether Japan or its leadership clearly tones down or re-clarifies its stance on “a Taiwan contingency / collective self-defense.” • Whether China lifts its restrictions on Japanese seafood, tourism, and cultural exchanges — or expands such measures. • Whether the U.S., Europe, or regional actors intervene through mediation, security proposals, or actions affecting the Taiwan Strait. • Whether economic data, trade flows, or investment patterns show sharp declines — reduced interdependence could accelerate a diplomatic reset or, conversely, deepen confrontation.
Video: A star-studded chorus performed “True Heroes” as a tribute to the HK firefighters who battled the blaze at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po. 群星合唱《真的英雄》獻予向參與撲救大埔宏福苑火災的香港消防員致敬.
We wish everyone a safe return home. Stay strong. The Grade 5 fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po has touched the hearts of countless citizens, with people contributing money and effort across races for days, embodying the Lion Rock Spirit.
American logistic expert report from China video: More US farm in troubles: Global fertilizer markets seize up after China, Russia keep theirs at home 美國物流專家從中國報導視訊有中文字幕: 更多美國農場陷入困境：中俄限制化肥出口導致全球市場緊縮
Fertilizer prices are soaring again, after Chinese and Russian suppliers sharply reduce exports.
Both are top producers of fertilizers, and previously supplied export markets. But China is locking up its supplies for its surging domestic market, as well as for its factory sector.
Russian fertilizers are now under sanction by the European Union, and farmers in the Eurozone are struggling to find suppliers elsewhere across the world. Since 2022, Russian exports of fertilizers are down over 80%.
American farmers are not nearly as reliant on imported fertilizers. But the shortages caused by Chinese and Russian export policy are pushing up prices by double-digits, even on US farms, as domestic fertilizers suppliers can freely raise prices to meet new market demand from Europe.
Johnson Choi Looking back and forward 蔡永強思前想後 Dec 3 2025
1974 to 1980, I studied hotel and restaurant management at the University of Hawaii, later pursuing an MBA degree. During that time, I held two jobs simultaneously: one as an Assistant Food & Beverage Manager at the Lobster House Restaurant in Hilton Hawaiian Village, and the other as an assistant manager and waiter at Maple Garden Restaurant. I was taking 21 credit hours per semester, averaging only four hours of sleep per day! At Hilton, the job offered reputation but little financial gain—a monthly salary of just one thousand dollars for 50 hours of work per week. Meanwhile, at Maple Garden, working four hours each night, I earned around eighty dollars in tips, totaling over two thousand dollars per month, all tax-free! Back then, a house cost only twenty-five thousand dollars, and I could have bought two or three—each of which is now worth two million dollars. Some of my classmates worked as waiters at the French restaurant Michelle, where they averaged 200 to 300 dollars in tips per night!
As a waiter, I detested the “tip pooling” system. Because I worked quickly, I could handle 5 to 8 tables at once, with a high turnover rate. When tips weren’t pooled, I often earned over a hundred dollars in a single night. In the 1970s, a hundred dollars was a significant amount of money! Whenever the boss was short-staffed, they would always call on me.
I have two major regrets in life: first, not using the money I earned to buy property; second, foolishly—extremely foolishly—choosing to stay in the United States!
In the 1970s, Hong Kong was more advanced than the United States, while mainland China lagged behind. Therefore, it was understandable for people from mainland China to aspire to come to the United States back then. But today, China’s development surpasses that of the United States tenfold, yet some are still willing to spend 500,000 to one million dollars to buy a U.S. passport! Your children will inevitably abandon their ancestral roots and forget their heritage—is it truly worth it?
Thirty years east of the river, thirty years west of the river. The next three hundred years will undoubtedly be an era dominated by the Chinese nation. As descendants of the Chinese people, we should take immense pride in this!
Highlight video of a former IMF Executive Director Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. speech (with Chinese subtitles): Xi Jinping calling for globalization?! Becoming a “non-violent” elephant?! The New Development Bank challenging the IMF and World Bank?! 前國際貨幣基金組織執行董事保羅諾蓋拉巴蒂斯塔二世的演講重點視頻有中文字幕: 習近平倡議全球化?! 要做「非暴力」的大象?! 新開發銀行對抗IMF與世銀?!
This video translates and summarizes the key points from a speech by a former Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund. It covers the imbalances in the global financial system, the geopolitical competition between the US–Europe and China, and how the BRICS countries are challenging the existing international order.
The video also includes many other highlights: • China offering peace and cooperation but receiving hostility in return?! • Ukraine and Argentina moved to the “white list”? • BRICS providing financial aid with minimal conditions?! • The US and Europe destroying their own financial order?! The system promoted during the Trump era is being dismantled?! • BRICS creating an alternative system to challenge the West?! • The US dollar system becoming a source of global risk?! BRICS preparing to launch a new global reserve currency?! • The US economy being even more fragile than during the financial crisis?! The next crash already on its way?! • G20 cooperation collapsing?! Members divided with no consensus and an empty communiqué?! • BRICS leading the Global South?! Brazil–India cooperation proving more effective than China acting alone?!
Over the past 50 years, every time gold skyrocketed, disaster followed. No exceptions.
In the 1970s, gold surged 24x, then the Bretton Woods system collapsed and the world fell into stagflation. In 2008, gold jumped 4x, then Lehman Brothers crashed and the subprime crisis devastated the global economy. Now, gold is surging again.
This time, three major crises are repeating: fiscal crisis, dollar crisis, and inflation crisis.
But 2020s America has one massive difference from the 1970s – there’s no key to break out of this cycle.
In this video, I’ll use 50 years of data to show you: ✓ Why gold surges are always crisis signals ✓ Which historical patterns are repeating right now ✓ Why smart money is positioning in gold early ✓ What ordinary people should do to prepare
Gold’s surge isn’t just an investment opportunity – it’s a risk warning.
Japan’s political arena dropped a “small signal flare” yesterday… 日本政壇昨天丟出了一顆“小信號彈”…
According to Kyodo News on December 2, Yuko Obuchi, a heavyweight female lawmaker of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), made a special trip to the Chinese Embassy in Japan for a face-to-face meeting with Ambassador Wu Jianghao, during which she voluntarily expressed her wish to visit China. Given the current extremely tense state of China–Japan relations, this scene is highly noteworthy.
Many people may not be very familiar with the name “Yuko Obuchi,” but she is by no means an ordinary “decorative” politician. She is a genuine political powerhouse in Japan:
First, she comes from a political family. She is the daughter of former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and has been elected to the House of Representatives eight consecutive times. After many years cultivating her constituency, she has firm foundations and deep seniority. She is an “old face” in Japanese politics, not some newcomer.
Second, she currently serves as the LDP’s Director-General of the Organization and Campaign Headquarters. In simple terms, she is in charge of intra-party mobilization, grassroots organization, and the election front — a key figure in the party’s political machinery. The weight of this position is almost on par with the LDP’s most senior posts, such as Secretary-General, Policy Research Council Chair, General Council Chair, or Election Strategy Committee Chair. This is not a role an ordinary backbencher can compare to.
Third, Japanese media have long portrayed Yuko Obuchi as a “tough yet gentle” political strongwoman and one of the symbolic figures of women’s participation in Japanese politics. She has promoted multiple bills involving women’s rights and social welfare. Her image is steady and pragmatic, and combined with the halo of being a former prime minister’s daughter, she wields considerable influence both inside and outside the party.
Fourth—and this is the most important factor for China–Japan relations in this meeting—she serves as the Secretary-General of the Japan–China Parliamentary Friendship League. This means she doesn’t merely say Japan should value relations with China; she has long acted as a “communication window” in parliamentary diplomacy. And this time, she didn’t come alone—she brought several members of the League to visit Ambassador Wu Jianghao. This clearly carries the implication that she is “representing a segment of Japan’s political establishment.”
👉 From this perspective, Yuko Obuchi’s engagement with the Chinese side at this moment sends at least two signals:
(1) The LDP is not monolithic. Some within the party still hope to find a “bottom point” to stop further deterioration in the current tense situation.
(2) Japan’s ruling party realizes that if relations continue to worsen, it will harm Japan’s own diplomatic space, economic environment, and security outlook. Therefore, someone needs to step forward to “make contact, feel out the situation, and test the temperature.”
👉 However, China–Japan relations cannot be repaired by a single meeting or a smiling photo. Everyone knows the fuse that ignited the current tension—certain Japanese politicians, represented by Sanae Takaichi, have repeatedly made extremely wrong and provocative statements regarding major core interests such as Taiwan. These actions have severely damaged the already fragile political trust between China and Japan, pushing relations to the brink of near “rupture.”
In such circumstances, no matter how “friendly” or proactive Yuko Obuchi may be, it is impossible for her alone to reverse the overall situation. A more realistic interpretation is this: Japan understands very well where the problem lies, but for now is unwilling—or afraid—to directly adjust the hardline stance of the Takaichi faction. So they let a relatively moderate, influential politician approach China first, to probe China’s bottom line, gauge the public reaction, and create space for potential policy adjustments down the road.
👉 In fact, China’s position has already been stated with utmost clarity:
Those Japanese politicians must fundamentally correct their wrong words and actions, explicitly restate Japan’s solemn and clear stance on the Taiwan issue, and return to the correct track defined by the four political documents and the One-China principle. Only then can both sides have a realistic basis to talk about “repair” or “improvement.”
If Yuko Obuchi is truly sincere, her key role is not in “saying nice things for the media,” but in whether she can—after returning to Japan—convey China’s concerns, bottom lines, and conditions fully and accurately to Japan’s leadership, and push the Takaichi Cabinet to take concrete actions instead of continuing word games or diplomatic theatrics.
This visit is more like a “tentative knock on the door.”
Whether the door actually opens will not depend on how many pleasant words she says, but on whether the Japanese government is willing to make clear and responsible choices on the key issues that matter.
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