Video: China’s 130 billion super slingshot to be built on the moon turned out to subvert your imagination, the moon base magnetic levitation throwing system 中國1300億將建在月球上的超級彈弓橫空出世，顛覆你的想像，月亮基地磁懸浮拋系統
https://rumble.com/v6qb7gu-chinas-130-billion-super-slingshot-to-be-built-on-the-moon.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP822hWDN/
https://youtu.be/DPBUOFg03_o?si=4c6kI5X-QyxQ6Q9i
Video#2: China’s top diplomat Wang Yi on country’s foreign policy, diplomacy, Global South, Philippines puppet show and Taiwan Province. By Johnson Choi, Mar 7 2025 中國最高外交官王毅談國家外交政策、南方國家，菲律賓木偶戲，外交與台灣省
https://rumble.com/v6qauku-wang-yi-on-countrys-foreign-policy-diplomacy-philippines-puppet-show-and-ta.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP82YKJXX/
https://youtu.be/S8-OTwz0CVg?si=iTOyyy6NWgP4kTk2
Complete video https://www.youtube.com/live/EfYjhp2OdcE?si=RYvT1dPAFUMPog8m 👈
Video: China’s top diplomat Wang Yi on country’s foreign policy, diplomacy and Taiwan Province 中國最高外交官王毅談國家外交政策、外交與台灣省
https://rumble.com/v6q9x96-wang-yi-on-countrys-foreign-policy-diplomacy-and-taiwan-province.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP82Yeada/
https://youtu.be/2SkaVXsvAiw?si=jB9Ochzi-zwKCl3c
Complete video https://www.youtube.com/live/EfYjhp2OdcE?si=RYvT1dPAFUMPog8m 👈
Video: China’s Wang Yi answers CNN: Will Trump’s “AMERICA FIRST” help China to play big role globally? 中國外長王毅答CNN：川普的「美國優先」政策會幫助中國在全球發揮重要作用嗎?
https://rumble.com/v6q9jiw-will-trumps-america-first-help-china-to-play-big-role-globally.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP82Y23JV/
https://youtu.be/zp8xWtY1WE4?si=4VbFN3_PPYV-vCTK
Complete video: https://www.youtube.com/live/EfYjhp2OdcE?si=RYvT1dPAFUMPog8m 👈
Are you guys watching Wang Yi press conference?
If you compare to the press conference with the Ukraine comedian at the White House, what is your take? Do you notice the different?
How do you compare China’s diplomatic corps to that of the United States?
What do you think on how Wang Yi answered Western Medias questions such as CNN & Bloomberg loaded questions? And not fall into the traps!
This is the question Wang Yi asked US on the fruitless trade war for 6 years and duties on Chinese goods. What did US really get?
Weaponized smear, The China “debt-trap” narrative is a falsehood that is a tool of geopolitics 武器化的抹黑，中國「債務陷阱」論調是地緣政治工具 By HUSSEIN ASKARY | China Daily Global | Updated: 2025-03-07
Although it has been debunked thoroughly by international experts, the “China debt-trap” narrative keeps surfacing as a mantra of anti-China campaigns. Most recently, a Swedish member of parliament brought it up in a public debate as part of what he called “China’s aggressive neocolonial operations in Africa”. While the impact of this narrative has diminished in recent years in the Global South, with more and more nations joining the Belt and Road Initiative, it is being repeated in the West to mobilize forces that consider China’s successful and peaceful rise as a geopolitical threat.
The narrative was launched as part of the first Donald Trump administration’s tool kit to counter the influence of China. In 2018, according to US media reports at the time, the United States Department of State commissioned two Harvard University students to write a report which was titled “Debtbook Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Leveraging of its Newfound Economic Influence and the Consequences for US Foreign Policy”.The Department of State informed the US and international mass media in May 2018 of the report and helped promote it. At the end of 2018, the Department of State even bragged in its financial report to US Congress that “the department continues to message on this subject, delivering additional high-performing materials, including: Harvard study warns of perilous ‘debt-trap diplomacy’”.
The Department of State requested more financing for such operations. In 2021, the US Congress responded through “the Strategic Competition Act of 2021”, allocating $300 million every year from 2022 to 2026 for this purpose. A major part of the financing will be utilized, according to the text of the Act, to provide “support for local media “stating that “the secretary of state, acting through the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor and in coordination with the administrator of the US Agency for International Development, shall support and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability related to the BRI”.
In September 2021, Zimbabwean media revealed that the US embassy in the country was recruiting and financing young activists and journalists to tarnish the investments made by China in the country as harmful to the nation. This made it clear that the anti-BRI propaganda with the debt-trap narrative as its main tool was going into high-gear throughout the world. A USAID-financed NGO in Serbia made global headlines by claiming that cancer rates had risen in Smederevo, a town where a Chinese steel plant was operating. The health authorities in Smederevo later challenged the information presented to the international media by the NGO.
The USAID’s role in financing anti-China and anti-BRI smear campaigns is well documented. It funds NGOs both in the US and abroad to recruit and organize talented “young leaders “and “opinion makers” pumping both finances and disinformation about China’s investments in the Global South through the BRI. The William & Mary’s Global Research Institute’s so-called information lab, AidData, is well known as such a USAID-financed source of disinformation about the BRI. It is not clear how the shutting down of the USAID will impact the channeling of the resources allocated by US Congress to anti-China and anti-BRI operations, but it is a strong blow to such operations according to some Western media.
The irony is that if the US had used these large amounts of money to do good in Africa through public goods projects rather than tarnishing the BRI and China with disinformation, the US would have had greater soft power in its competition with China. For example, with the $1.5 billion, the US could build 250 hospitals of the same type as the China-built Mahusekwa Hospital for antenatal care in Mashonaland in Zimbabwe, which cost $6 million. The same amount could be used to build about 500 level-three hospitals such as the Gachororo Health Centre in Juja, Kenya, a 200-bed facility that cost $3.2 million. However, such win-win thinking does not penetrate the mind of policymakers in Washington who are saturated with the zero-sum game of geopolitics.
There are two ways to deal with the debt-trap narrative: one is to show its fallacies in a systematic and pedagogical way; the other is to develop innovative methods in financing infrastructure along the BRI in addition to the way China has successfully done in the first 10 years. It is a matter of reality that many nations, especially developing countries, are in dire need for infrastructure to release their economic growth potential and sustain it. Nations are tired of aid programs that have continued for decades without any tangible results in their attempts to eliminate poverty and achieve prosperity.
Regarding the first point, a three-step method of exposing the fallacies of the debt-trap narrative can be adopted so that it can be applied to any country that is alleged to be a victim of a “Chinese debt-trap”. The three steps are examinations of the composition of the debt of that country, the quality of the debt incurred by that country, and finally the sources of financial instability in that country. The samples used to develop this method are famous cases singled out by the narrative creators: Sri Lanka, Zambia, Kenya, Pakistan and Montenegro. They show that there is no basis for blaming China for the financial problems of those countries.
As for financing infrastructure in Belt and Road countries, it is imperative to continue the success of the Chinese method of low-interest and long-term loans no matter what the opponents say. But China alone cannot fill the gap of tens of trillions of dollars necessary for developing modern infrastructure in Asia, Africa and South America. Other actors have to step up and resources have to be pooled. First, nations must develop national financial institutions to mobilize local resources through national “development banks”.Regional development banks are also advisable. For example, the Arab countries of the Gulf have more than $4 trillion in their sovereign wealth funds. The Chinese financial markets can also become a source of credit, as has been proven by the Panda bonds that are becoming increasingly popular in developing countries. In addition, bilateral development funds between creditors and debtors can be created in which a small portion of the natural resources of debtor country can be leveraged to generate credit from financial institutions in the creditor nations. In addition to China’s rise, the BRI is one of the great success stories of the 21st century. It must be promoted and defended against ill-intended and geopolitically motivated attacks such as the “debt trap “narrative.
The author is vice-chairman of the Belt and Road Institute in Sweden and a distinguished research fellow at the Guangdong Institute of International Strategies. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
Video: China told US if you want to fight, China not afraid, but don’t find ridiculous excuses to blame Fentanyl on China, just like your rapists claimed the problem on women, if no women they could not commit the crime! That is US twisted logic on Fentanyl! 美國要戰就戰, 不用天天吹水. 美國對芬太尼的扭曲推理就好像在說美國的強姦犯如果沒有女人他們就不會去強姦，問題不在強姦犯身上，問題是女人的錯. 你同意嗎?
https://rumble.com/v6q8m9i-china-told-us-if-you-want-to-fight-china-not-afraid.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP82FrnmT/
https://youtu.be/2CwrEfpWoPc?si=V481Vfhyx3FV5pWh
How DeepSeek is Preventing AI from Replacing Humanity. AI won’t just be a tool, it could become humanity’s equal partner or its downfall. It all depends on what our human society demonstrate to it. If it’s built solely to maximize profits for a few, we’re headed straight for a highway to hell. DeepSeek, by going open-source, offers a way out. DeepSeek 如何阻止人工智慧取代人類。人工智慧不僅僅是一種工具，它可能成為人類的平等夥伴，也可能成為人類的垮台。這完全取決於我們人類社會向它展示什麼。如果它只是為了少數人的利潤最大化而建造，那麼我們就會直接走上通往地獄的高速公路。 DeepSeek 透過開源提供了一條出路 March 5 2025
This dystopian nightmare—where a billionaire monopolizes 99% of Earth’s land, water, and even air, while billions of impoverished people are confined to tiny homes surviving on their own waste, and anyone who resists will be killed by robots and drones—comes from 刘慈欣(Cixin Liu), China’s most renowned sci-fi writer. Best known for The Three-Body Problem, which earned him the Hugo Award and was praised by Obama. However, few Western media have paid attention to Liu’s earlier short story, For the Benefit of Mankind, which paints a chilling vision.
Unlike Western sci-fi, where robots are bound by the rule “do not harm humans,” Liu’s creations prioritize “the inviolability of private property,” granting them license to kill the poor to protect resources hoarded by the wealthy. This grim outlook stems from a pre-DeepSeek era when Silicon Valley dominated AI development—a trajectory already unfolding in the U.S. In 2021, Google disclosed that its U.S. data centres consumed 4.34 billion gallons of water—freshwater effectively diverted from American communities.
Take Arizona, one of the driest states, with annual rainfall just half of the national average. Yet following Apple, Microsoft and Meta, Google planning a massive data centre in Mesa, demanding 1-4 million gallons of water daily for cooling—equivalent to the daily usage of 27,000 local residents. In 2023, Business Insider revealed Arizona’s groundwater faces a 4% annual deficit, projected to take a century to recover. Despite this, the state didn’t restrict tech giants’ “water-guzzling beasts,” but the development of Phoenix.
Silicon Valley giants not only threaten the American people’s right to development but also their right to survival.
In 2019, during a severe drought in South Carolina, Google’s Berkeley County data centre drained 1.5 million gallons of groundwater daily while siphoning 5 million gallons from municipal supplies—tripling the region’s safe water consumption limit. Local residents protested, but the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control approved Google’s request. Ironically, the same department ordered the utility company Mount Pleasant Waterworks, responsible for supplying water to 45,000 residents, to reduce its usage by 57% over the next four years.
These data centres could originally be relocated to underwater or high-latitude regions for natural cooling. Instead, they cluster near urban areas to shave milliseconds off-network latency, evaporating billions of gallons as collateral damage.
Chinese strategist, Prof. Wang Xiangsui warns of an emerging “quasi-human society” dominated by AI and robots. If governed by profit-obsessed corporations or individuals, clashes over resources between humans and this artificial society could escalate into full-scale conflict. While water scarcity now grabs headlines, energy poses a longer-term crisis.
Elon Musk’s Grok3, powered by 100,000 NVIDIA H100 chips, consumes up to 28% more annual electricity than New York City. This electricity power is enough for 8.2 million people, yet its daily U.S. user base remains under 1 million, largely due to its $40/month subscription fee – According to the US Federal Reserve System, 37% of Americans are not even able to cover $400 unexpected expenses. Let alone OpenAl’s ChatGPT-4.5, which charges $150 per million tokens.
In contrast, DeepSeek R1 costs just $2.19 for the same output—democratizing AI access for all. Prof. Wang points out; the more important point is DeepSeek offers humanity an alternative to self-destruction. Autonomous AI could evolve into an equal partner or a lethal adversary, akin to Oedipus in Greek myth. Its trajectory hinges on its foundational code: profit-maximization for elites risks creating a “quasi-human” society that overthrows humanity.
Fortunately, DeepSeek recently open-sourced 7 technologies addressing a core challenge—training powerful AI without expending more resources. This could drastically reduce the water and energy conflicts between humans and quasi-human societies.
Traditional AI training wastes energy by processing data in batches. DeepSeek’s DualPipe allows simultaneous data intake and training, cutting runtime by half and saving 30% energy and water. Innovations like DeepEP, DeepGEMM, and 3FS boost server efficiency, enabling clusters to support 4-7 times more users. FlashMLA democratizes access by empowering low-cost chips to rival premium hardware, narrowing the global digital divide. Even scheduling tweaks—prioritizing user services by day and AI training at night—shrink infrastructure demands.
To sway profit-driven U.S. firms, DeepSeek revealed the staggering profitability of these open-sourced technologies: a 545% margin, earning $562,027 daily, theoretically $200 million annually. On the other hand, according to CNBC, OpenAI lost $5 billion in 2024.
Overnight, OpenAI and NVIDIA stocks plunged over 10%. European banks now hail Chinese tech as a historic investment. Prof. Wang believes this is “humanity’s greatest self-rescue mission,” DeepSeek need not top every single AI performance chart. Its mere existence as an open-source rival blocks tech oligarchs from realizing Cixin Liu’s nightmare. Originally, Silicon Valley envisioned AI as a first-class ticket for elites to soar above the masses. DeepSeek, however, adds economy seats—allowing ordinary people to ascend alongside billionaires.
The battle between open-source collaboration and closed-profit models may never end, resembling quantum tides in perpetual flux. Yet this dynamic equilibrium sustains hope. So long as 99% of humanity can still afford open-sourced AI like DeepSeek, it marks a victory for China’s millennia-old ethos of “deep seeking.”
In March, 2025, as global capital fuels a new future, the “quasi-human society” remains unborn, but the crown of computational hegemony is already trampled underfoot. The open-source president ascends the palace, steps onto the balcony, and in his face, every person sees their own reflection.
China Is in the Good Part of the Historical Cycle. Professor Peter Turchin predicted the onset of political unrest in the U.S. In the first part, he outlined the factors driving America toward civil war. In the second, he examines China’s integrative stage, noting that administrative elites dominate, unlike the U.S., where economic elites hold power. Overall, he remains optimistic about China. 中國正處於歷史週期的良好階段。彼得·圖爾欽教授預測了美國政治動盪的爆發。在第二部分中，他審視了中國的一體化階段，指出行政精英占主導地位，而美國則由經濟精英掌握權力。整體而言，他對中國仍持樂觀態度 March 6 2025
The China Academy: In your view, where does China currently stand in the cycles of political integration and disintegration, especially given the endless predictions of China’s collapse by Western scholars?
Peter Turchin: First of all, in order for me to speak authoritatively, my group would need to analyze a lot of data.
However, we have done this for the previous cycle in Chinese history—the Qing Dynasty. We have a paper where we showed what happened, specifically focusing on the crisis of the Taiping Rebellion.
Starting with the Taiping Rebellion and ending with the fall of the dynasty and the Chinese Revolution, this period fits the theory very well. During this time, there was widespread popular immiseration, elite overproduction, and resulting state weakness. We can speak confidently about that period.
But what happened after that? And what is happening now? China experienced a 100-year disintegrative period, starting with the Taiping Rebellion and ending with the victory of the Communist Party in 1949.
After 1949, China entered an integrative period. There were some aftershocks, such as the Cultural Revolution, but with the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping, China firmly entered the integrative period. Typically, integrative periods last for about a century. Based on this, one might conclude that China still has time to resolve its issues.
However, there are some problems, even without doing a deep dive into data. Based on what I’ve read and from speaking to people during my visit to China in December, I see a real issue with the overproduction of degree holders. The jobless rate for these individuals is high, and many are taking positions unrelated to their training. This creates a lot of discontent.
This issue is partly similar to challenges faced by other East Asian countries like South Korea and Japan. It stems, in part, from Confucian philosophy, which pushes parents to encourage their children to pursue higher and higher education. While this is a good individual strategy, it can have negative societal impacts.
But there are other factors that counteract this issue. For instance, while everyone is worried about China’s low birth rate, from the perspective of political stability, this can actually work in China’s favor.
Revolutions are typically driven by young people in their 20s and 30s, as they are more reckless and willing to take risks. These young people act as “revolutionary troops,” even if they are not the leaders. This phenomenon is called the “youth bulge.” When there is a large cohort of people in their 20s, it creates the potential for discontent to escalate into violence, as seen during the Arab Spring.
In China, however, the “youth bust” is reducing the number of young people. This has two effects. First, it decreases the supply of revolutionary troops in the long run. Second, as the number of workers declines, market forces will push wages higher because businesses will compete for a smaller labor pool. This will prevent the “wealth pump” effect from operating as strongly.
Another factor is the nature of China’s ruling system. Unlike the United States, which is a plutocracy (rule by the wealthy), China’s ruling class is essentially made up of mandarins. In many ways, China has reverted to its traditional governance structure, which has been in place for over 2,000 years. While the ruling party is called the Communist Party, it could just as easily be called the Confucianist Party.
One key issue is fiscal capital. If fiscal capital becomes too powerful, it can be corrosive, as it doesn’t produce much and is largely parasitic. By controlling billionaires, as the current administration in China is doing, the government is addressing one potential source of instability.
Q8
The China Academy: From the current state of society, it seems that the “wannabe elites” in China might choose to “lie flat” (i.e., give up striving). By contrast, in the U.S., frustrated wannabe elites are more likely to express anger. What is your view on this?
Peter Turchin: I don’t think so. Let’s look at Chinese history again—take the Taiping Rebellion, for example. It was an extremely violent rebellion. China has a long history of peasant uprisings.
If you examine Chinese history, even just within the last century, you see the civil war between Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists and Mao Zedong’s Communists—it was incredibly violent. Then, during the Cultural Revolution, young people in China were also extremely violent.
I believe that this is fundamentally human nature. It’s not unique to China or America—it’s just human nature. When the conditions in a country become strong enough to push it into instability, then civil war or revolution will occur. It’s all about the conditions. However, I don’t see those conditions currently operating in China.
Q9
The China Academy: Have you observed the societal conditions in Japan?
Peter Turchin: Yes, one of my colleagues has studied Japan. First of all, immiseration in Japan is very serious, although it’s not often reported.
Over the past 20 years, real wages in Japan have declined by about 20–25%, which is astonishing. The economy hasn’t grown much, but wages have declined even more sharply. As a result, a “wealth pump” is at work, creating a growing number of wealthy individuals. However, the political system in Japan is extremely corrupt, and much of this wealth is used to maintain politicians in power.
Immiseration in Japan is so bad that the average height of the population is actually declining. I saw the data myself, and I could hardly believe it. There’s a lot of underlying discontent. For example, one of Japan’s prime ministers was recently assassinated—a clear sign of instability just beneath the surface.
At the same time, Japan is also experiencing a “baby bust.” The majority of the population is now elderly, and they are not likely to revolt due to the absence of a “youth bulge.” It’s possible that Japan won’t experience a civil war or revolution, but conditions will likely continue to deteriorate. Things may simply get worse and worse until something unpredictable happens. Japan is definitely in a crisis mode at this point, unlike China.
Q10
The China Academy: In your research on ancient China, you’ve highlighted characteristics of Chinese society such as its capacity for collective action, centralized governance, and strong internal cohesion. Could these traits explain China’s rise over the past 4–5 decades?
Peter Turchin: Absolutely. I’ve written another book, Ultrasociety, which explains this theory. Essentially, societies that evolve on steppe frontiers, like China on the frontier between China and Mongolia, experience intense interaction with external threats. These threats drive societies to become more cohesive internally and more cooperative.
This phenomenon isn’t unique to China. The same thing happened in Russia and even the United States, which had its own frontier.
The result of such conditions is the evolution of institutions that are conducive to centralization and the coordination of large populations. Confucianism, for example, is one of these institutions. It’s a creed that promotes internal cohesion.
Additionally, China’s administrative elites dominate the system, unlike in the United States, where economic elites hold the most power. This difference is also a result of China’s cultural “genome,” so to speak.
If I were making predictions in 1950, I would have confidently predicted that China would rise again. Institutions like these take a long time to dissipate, and that dissipation was not happening in China. Therefore, I would have confidently predicted that China would eventually become a preeminent power.
Q11
The China Academy: Do you think that the governance institutions of China—centralized and bureaucratic, with meritocracy as some describe—are a uniquely distinguishing trait of the Chinese state?
Peter Turchin: No, it’s not unique to China. For example, if you look at France, it has also been a bureaucratically ruled country. Although this is changing now, if you examine France from around 1870 to 2000—during the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics—the elites were recruited through a system very similar to China’s.
In France, the system was based on educational credentials. There are a set of elite schools called thegrandes écoles. If you wanted to enter government, you went to a school for public administration. If you wanted to lead a major company, you attended a different grande école. Most of the largest French companies were state-owned enterprises, so the system was similar to China’s in many ways. It produced a very similar class of elites, or “mandarins.”
This system remained highly effective until the last 10–15 years, when it started to break down. But up until that point, it was a very functional system.
Q12
The China Academy: The U.S.-China rivalry is very intense. In your view, would the U.S. strategy of containing China further strengthen China’s internal cohesion? I recall you mentioned that Russia became more internally unified during the Ukraine
war.
Peter Turchin: Yes, this is a pattern that many American leaders fail to understand. Containment strategies often create feedback loops, strengthening internal cohesion within the targeted country.
That said, interstate competition—so long as it does not escalate into violent conflict—is actually beneficial. Competition in economic, ideological, and cultural spheres can be good for all parties involved. It helps counteract the “iron law of oligarchy,” which holds that elites, when left unchecked, tend to become selfish and drive their countries into decline.
For example, the Soviet Union did not lose a “hard war” against the United States. Instead, people became dissatisfied with how the country was being governed, which led to its collapse. Interstate competition helps to prevent such stagnation.
Looking forward, I hope we continue to see interstate competition, even if it takes extreme forms like tariffs or trade restrictions, as long as it doesn’t lead to violence. Such competition benefits everyone. For instance, the United States has imposed numerous restrictions on China, and China is finding ways to overcome them. Similarly, Russia, despite being the most sanctioned country in history, has managed to grow economically during the war, while Germany is now in decline.
Of course, the Ukraine war is a tragedy—it has already killed hundreds of thousands of people. But competition without war would be good for everyone.
Q13
The China Academy: Some people believe that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has broken free from the historic cycles of rise and fall in Chinese history. What’s your view on this?
Peter Turchin: So far, I see Chinese history continuing to follow the dynastic cycle. Right now, we are in the “good” part of the cycle. There may not be an emperor, but power is still being transferred—just in different ways, not from father to son. Otherwise, the system is very similar to the traditional dynastic cycles.
Whether the Chinese leadership will be able to break this cycle depends on two things. First, advancements in our understanding of societal dynamics—what I call “cliodynamics.” Second, whether government officials take this knowledge into account and use it to prevent a slide into crisis.
This is one of the reasons for my work—I want us to break free from these cycles. China certainly has time to do this because I don’t see a revolution happening anytime soon. There is time to understand the causes of instability and take action.
China can implement policies that are impossible in Western liberal democracies. One possibility is limiting the number of university places and encouraging more people to pursue vocational training or skilled trades, such as operating machinery. This could help address the overproduction of degree holders. Of course, I hope people won’t hate me for suggesting this.
Q14
The China Academy: Many Chinese people are now worried about AI. They fear that the development of AI could lead to widespread unemployment and further overproduction of elites. What should human society do in response? Is there a way to achieve a fair distribution system?
Peter Turchin: Yes, that’s one of the most important things—to make sure that AI, which will be very powerful, benefits society as a whole. The benefits of AI technology must not end up concentrated in the hands of a small elite. Instead, they need to be shared broadly across the population.
Q15
The China Academy: And finally, what factors do you think are truly concerning for China’s future?
Peter Turchin: I think controlling the overproduction of youth with advanced degrees is the most important long-term issue for China.
China does have other problems, such as the real estate bubble. However, I don’t think this will cause irreparable damage. It just means that people who bought second or third apartments will become poorer—they already have, since property prices have dropped. But this situation can be resolved without undermining the overall capacity of society.
Another key factor is avoiding getting into a hard war, especially over Taiwan. From what I perceive, Chinese leadership really does not want a war, and I think that’s a good strategy.
In principle, I’m actually very optimistic about China—much more so than many other parts of the world. That said, take my optimism with a grain of salt, as I would need to conduct much deeper analysis to make definitive statements of this kind.
Peter Turchin
Peter Turchin is a complexity scientist, emeritus professor at the University of Connecticut, project leader at the Complexity Science Hub Vienna, founder of Cliodynamics, and author of End Times (2023)
Video: My Life My Destiny, Chinese Life China Dreams 我命由我不由天(尤其是美國)中國人、民族復興，中國夢，弱國無外交，強國富民夢，東升西降，已經成為定局。
https://rumble.com/v6q7jl8-my-life-my-destiny-chinese-life-china-dreams.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP82Nj9uU/
https://youtu.be/-cb1IO8vdCo?si=rp1CIsNTwuo-fY20
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