Movie Star Carina Lau mourn the death of Queen Elizabeth invited backlash 電影明星劉嘉玲悼念伊麗莎白女王的逝世，引發強烈反對

Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 – As Qin Gang (Chinese ambassador to US) put it, if the Taiwan Policy Act is passed, the foundation of US-China relations will collapse. by SF Bay Area China Group 9-18-22

So this is a big deal and we should really pay attention to it. It is probably part of the US plan to provoke China to unify Taiwan by non-peaceful means, and to make Taiwan another Ukraine to hurt China.

Link to the US government of the Taiwan Policy Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/4428/text.

Some commentators said the text has 107 pages, but we found fewer pages. We also found a shorter version https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SBS%20Taiwan%20Policy%20Act%20FINAL%20(1).pdf

which appears to be a summary of the Act but we are not sure. We worked with the longer version, which appears to be the original text of the Act.

Enclosed are the following:

Our excerpts of the important sections of the Act.

Our 2 page executive summary of the important sections of the Act.

A NYTimes article by Bob Menendez, a co-author of the Act, arguing that the US can’t afford to repeat Ukraine’s mistake with Taiwan.

We learned the following from the Chinese language videos on this Act:

It was probably in the works for 2 years and is the result of the Taiwan lobby in the US and the Tsai government working with the US.

Menendez and Graham visited Taiwan to get orders for 24 Boeings. In return, they pushed this legislation through the Foreign relations Comm. But the Act was modified slightly in the comm to temper the most controversial parts (e.g. changing the name of the Taiwan office like Lithuania) to one that is non-binding on the executive branch.

The DPP and the Tsai government have passed laws that dovetail with the Act. For example:

1. The Tsai government is pushing a controversial digital intermediary service act that curtails free speech rights. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/08/22/2003783934
2. The Tsai government banned a TV station that is pro-KMT candidate a couple years ago on pretext.
3. The Tsai government changed the law (dual citizenship) to allow US citizens to become civil servants in the Taiwan government. This allows US personnel to be embedded, as provided under the Act, in the Taiwan government and military to control the Taiwan government and military. The former Taiwan president, Ma Yingjeou, was severely attacked by the DPP on the suspicion of just holding a US green card when he was a candidate.
4. The Tsai government has terrorized opposition parties and those who voice dissent by branding them as PRC agents or sympathizers.

It’s all bad, but apart from the $6.5B, the most escalatory sections are the sections on military interoperability, military training (206), accelerated procurement, non-NATO status (212) and above all, the sanctions regime on individuals, financial systems, industries (802-808). This is an attempt to prepare and impose a Russia-type sanctions regime.

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SEC. 802. DETERMINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN.
(a) In General.—The President shall determine, in accordance with subsection (b), whether—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or any proxy, or person or entity under the control of or acting at the direction thereof, is knowingly engaged in a significant escalation in aggression, including overt or covert military activity, in or against Taiwan, compared to the level of aggression in or against Taiwan on or after the date of the enactment of this Act; and

(2) if such engagement exists, whether such escalation demonstrates an attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the physical or political control of Taiwan, including by—

(A) overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions in Taiwan;
(B) occupying any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act;
(C) violating the territorial integrity of Taiwan; or
(D) taking significant action against Taiwan, including—
(i) creating a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(ii) seizing the outer lying islands of Taiwan; or
(iii) initiating a significant cyber attack that threatens the civilian or military infrastructure of Taiwan.

(b) Timing Of Determinations.—The President shall make the determination described in subsection (a)—
(1) not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) after the first determination under paragraph (1), not less frequently than once every 90 days (or more frequently, if warranted) during the 1-year period beginning on such date of enactment; and
(3) after the end of such 1-year period, not less frequently than once every 120 days.

(c) Report Required.—Upon making a determination described in subsection (a), the President shall submit a report describing the factors influencing such determination to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(d) Congressional Requests.—Not later than 30 days after receiving a request from the chairman and ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives with respect to whether the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party, including through any proxies of the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party, has engaged in an act described in subsection (a), the President shall—

(1) determine if the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party has engaged in such an act; and

(2) submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that contains a detailed explanation of such determination.

SEC. 803. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN TAIWAN.
(a) Defined Term.—In this section, the term “top decision-making bodies” may include—

(1) the CCP Politburo Standing Committee;
(2) the CCP Party Central Military Commission;
(3) the CCP Politburo;
(4) the CCP Central Committee;
(5) the CCP National Congress;
(6) the State Council of the People’s Republic of China; and
(7) the State Central Military Commission of the CCP.

(b) In General.—Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 802(a), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 807 with respect to at least 100 officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China specified in subsection (c), to the extent such officials can be identified.

(c) Officials Specified.—The officials specified in this subsection shall include—

(1) senior civilian and military officials of the People’s Republic of China and military officials who have command or clear and direct decision-making power over military campaigns, military operations, and military planning against Taiwan conducted by the People’s Liberation Army;
(2) senior civilian and military officials of the People’s Republic of China who have command or clear and direct decision-making power in the Chinese Coast Guard and the Chinese People’s Armed Police and are engaged in planning or implementing activities that involve the use of force against Taiwan;
(3) senior or special advisors to the President of the People’s Republic of China;
(4) officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China who are members of the top decision-making bodies of that Government;
(5) the highest-ranking Chinese Communist Party members of the decision-making bodies referred to in paragraph (4); and
(6) officials of the Government of the People’s Republic of China in the intelligence agencies or security services who—

(A) have clear and direct decisionmaking power; and
(B) have engaged in or implemented activities that—
(i) materially undermine the military readiness of Taiwan;
(ii) overthrow or decapitate the Taiwan’s government;
(iii) debilitate Taiwan’s electric grid, critical infrastructure, or cybersecurity systems through offensive electronic or cyber attacks;
(iv) undermine Taiwan’s democratic processes through campaigns to spread disinformation; or
(v) involve committing serious human rights abuses against citizens of Taiwan, including forceful transfers, enforced disappearances, unjust detainment, or torture.

(d) Additional Officials.—

SEC. 804. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Definitions.—In this section:
(1) JOINT-EQUITY BANK.—The term “joint-equity bank” means a bank under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China in which—
(A) the bank’s equity is owned jointly by the shareholders; and
(B) the Government of the People’s Republic of China holds an interest.

(2) NATIONAL JOINT-STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK.—The term “national joint-stock commercial bank” means a bank under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China in which—
(A) the bank’s stock is owned jointly by the shareholders; and
(B) the Government of the People’s Republic of China holds an interest.

(3) NATIONAL STATE-OWNED POLICY BANK.—The term “national state-owned policy bank” means a bank that—
(A) is incorporated in the People’s Republic of China; and
(B) was established by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to advance investments in specific policy domains that advance the interests and goals of the People’s Republic of China.

(b) In General.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 802(a), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 807(a) with respect to
(A) at least 5 state-owned banks in the People’s Republic of China, including at least 3 of the largest state-owned banks.
(B) at least 3 national joint-stock commercial banks in the People’s Republic of China;
(C) at least 3 national state-owned policy banks in the People’s Republic of China;
(D) at least 3 joint-equity banks or other commercial banks in the People’s Republic of China; and
(E) entities that regulate the banking sector of the People’s Republic of China, or major financial asset management companies regulated by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.

SEC. 806. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 807 on any foreign person that the President determines, while acting for or on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, knowingly—
(1) ordered or engaged directly in activities interfering significantly in a democratic process in Taiwan; or
(2) with the objective of destabilizing Taiwan, engaged directly in, or ordered—
(A) malicious, offensive cyber-enabled activities targeting—
(i) the Government or armed forces of Taiwan; or
(ii) the critical infrastructure, including military, industrial, or financial infrastructure of Taiwan;
(B) significant economic practices intended to coerce or intimidate—
(i) the government in Taiwan; or
(ii) businesses, academic, or civil society institutions located in Taiwan; or
(C) military activities that are designed to intimidate the armed forces of Taiwan or that seek to normalize a coercive military posture and sustained presence by the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait.
(b) Waiver.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (a) if the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written determination that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 808. IMPLEMENTATION; REGULATIONS; PENALTIES.
(a) Implementation.—The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title.

Executory summary of Taiwan Policy Act of 2022

Sections 102, 103, 104

De facto recognization of Taiwan as an independent nation.  Changes name of “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” in the United States to the “Taiwan Representative Office.”

Section 203​Joint mechanism with Taiwan to recurringly assess the threats Taiwan faces from the People’s Republic of China, and identify nonmaterial and material solutions to deter and, if necessary, defeat such threats.

Section 204​2 billion Loan to modernize Taiwan’s security capabilities to deter and defeat aggression by PRC. Assess and enhance readiness of its defense forces, including realistic training, recruiting, manpower shortage (including that of reserves) and its impact on a conflict with PRC, Taiwan government budget support, campaign to raise Taiwanese awareness of risks, security of critical infrastructure (transport, communication and energy).  Assess and enhance Taiwan cybersecurity of government and military networks, and any resistance found within the Taiwan government and military. Maximum grant of 6.5 billion to Taiwan.

Section 205​Close consultation among representatives of Taiwan, Congress, industry, and the Executive branch about requests and the needs of Taiwan to purchase arms before Taiwan submits formal requests for such purchases.

Section 206​comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to (1) achieve interoperability; (2) familiarize the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other; and(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities.  The training program should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

Section 207​The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to congress a written assessment, of Taiwan’s needs in the areas of civilian defense and resilience, including 

(A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high tech labor force;

(B) logistics support for civilian defense role allocation;

(C) recruitment and skills training for Taiwan’s defense and civilian sectors;

(D) strategic stockpiling of resources related to critical food security and medical supplies; and

(E) other defense and resilience needs and considerations at the provincial, city, and neighborhood levels.

The assessment will analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resiliency among its people and in key economic sectors, identify opportunities for Taiwan to enhance communications at all levels to strengthen trust and understanding between the military, other government departments, civilian agencies and the general public, including

(A) communications infrastructure necessary to ensure reliable communications in response to a conflict or crisis; and

(B) a plan to effectively communicate to the general public in response to a conflict or crisis.  

The assessment will identify the areas and means through which the United States could provide training, exercises, and assistance at all levels to support the needs discovered through the assessment and fill any critical gaps where capacity falls short of such needs.

SEC. 212. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN AS A MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally.

SEC. 214. International military education and training cooperation with Taiwan.  Taiwan is authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program to train future leaders of Taiwan.

SEC. 301. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.  The strategy is to counter covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work, and information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures.  The strategy includes the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by PRC including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of the government in Taiwan and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by PRC;

(B) assistance to enhance the government in Taiwan’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the PRC on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations.

SEC. 405.​United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 did not address (B) the issue of representation and meaningful participation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or in any related organizations; and (C) did not take a position on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty. The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people of Taiwan.”

SEC. 605. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. Eligible United States citizens will be awarded 5-10 fellowships for placement of fellows in an agency of the government in Taiwanor an organization outside of the government in Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the United States Government from which the fellow is or had been employed.

SEC. 607. TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE. A United States Government employee who has been awarded a fellowship under SEC. 605. May be assignment to the government in Taiwan or an organization described in SEC. 605.

This Is How the U.S. Will Stand With Taiwan NYTimes 8.3.22

Bob Menendez

Vladimir Putin’s brutal attack on his Ukrainian neighbors has sparked global outrage — and forged unprecedented unity — among the democratic nations of the world. Not so with Xi Jinping, the hypernationalist president of the People’s Republic of China. Rather, he is no doubt taking notes and learning lessons from Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine to apply to his plans for Taiwan.

The United States and our partners in the international community need to do the same to develop and put in place a new and more resilient strategy for Taiwan while there is still time.

A clear lesson from the war in Ukraine is that authoritarian leaders have been emboldened in recent years by dysfunctional democracies and hesitant international institutions. Accordingly, the United States needs less ambiguity to guide our approach to Taiwan. In today’s world — with Mr. Xi’s China — a robust and credible deterrence to preserve peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait requires clarity in word and deed. President Biden vowed in May to use force to defend Taiwan — the third time he has said so, even though his aides have said the longstanding U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity has not changed.

The moral and strategic case for standing with Taiwan, whose people share our interests and our values, could not be clearer. China is carrying out influence campaigns against Taiwan using cyberattacks and disinformation, deploying propaganda to reinforce its “one China” message, spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories to divide Taiwanese society and make it easier to gain control of the island. This is a plan of attack eerily reminiscent of Mr. Putin’s in Ukraine.

China is also employing coercive economic tactics against any nation or company that does not fall in line with Beijing’s anti-Taiwan policy, going as far as imposing a trade embargo on Lithuania for welcoming a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius. Given Taiwan’s role as “foundry to the world” for the manufacture of advanced microchips, Beijing’s willingness to threaten supply chains and potentially hold the global economy hostage is a matter of concern for the United States’ prosperity and security and those of our allies and partners.

Making matters worse, Taiwan now also faces an aggressive Chinese military, which seems determined to be postured for an invasion in the coming years.

China’s rapid military buildup with new technologies and weapons deployed against Taiwan threatens to destabilize the entire Indo-Pacific. There are near daily Chinese military incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone and dangerous and unsafe Chinese Navy maneuvers intended to coerce and intimidate Taiwan on the high seas as well. Only a few weeks ago, 29 Chinese military aircraft, including six bombers, flew into Taiwan’s air defense zone — sending a clear message of a potential blockade — before returning to base. These are not the actions of a nation with a policy of maintaining peace and stability. These are the actions of a nation intent on aggression.

Moreover, Beijing’s recent threats over Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan were as predictable as they were indicative of Mr. Xi’s truculence. But the United States must be clear: Using her visit as an excuse for performative sound and fury is simply that, a pretext for more aggressive steps that China has been preparing to take anyway. That is why Ms. Pelosi was right in not letting China decide who can and cannot visit Taiwan. The result of Beijing’s bluster should be to stiffen resolve in Taipei, in Washington and across the region. There are many strategies to continue standing up to Chinese aggression; there is clear bipartisan congressional agreement on the importance of acting now to provide the people of Taiwan with the type of support they desperately need.

We saw the warning signs for Ukraine in 2014 and failed to take action that might have deterred further Russian aggression. We cannot afford to repeat that mistake with Taiwan.

That is why I have worked with Senator Lindsey Graham to introduce the bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.

Our legislation would reinforce the security of Taiwan by providing almost $4.5 billion in security assistance over the next four years and recognizing Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” — a powerful designation to facilitate closer military and security ties. It would also expand Taiwan’s diplomatic space through its participation in international organizations and in multilateral trade agreements.

The legislation would also take concrete steps to counter China’s aggressive influence campaigns, impose crippling economic costs if Beijing takes hostile action against Taiwan (such as financial, banking, visa and other sanctions) and reform American bureaucratic practices to bolster support for Taiwan’s democratic government. In short, this effort would be the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. policy toward Taiwan since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

While Beijing will likely rely on a planned narrative of blaming the United States for any aggression, the fact is that it’s China, not the United States, that has been steadily seeking to change the status quo with Taiwan.

The United States and our partners must remain cleareyed as we respond with measured steps during this critical window of opportunity — before China unalterably changes the cross-strait dynamic to its advantage and sets the stage for a possible invasion of Taiwan — to reinvigorate our diplomatic strategy. To work with Taipei to modernize its military to maintain deterrence. To combat Beijing’s political influence and misinformation campaigns. And to develop deeper ties between our two peoples.

As China challenges us across every dimension of national security — militarily, economically and diplomatically and on values — we are laying out a new vision that ensures our country is positioned to defend Taiwan for decades to come. Getting our strategy right is essential to deter and constrain Beijing’s problematic behavior and to encourage Mr. Xi to make different choices from Mr. Putin’s.

To be clear, the United States is not the world’s policeman. But surely we have a moral and practical obligation to stand with the people of Taiwan, who want only to be able to determine their own future.

If we do nothing, then we must be comfortable with effectively ceding Taiwan by letting China continue its unabated military, economic and diplomatic bullying campaign.

Mr. Putin’s delusions in Ukraine could not make the catastrophic global consequences of inaction clearer.

SEC. 102. TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN TAIWAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and other Federal departments and agencies shall—

(1) engage with the democratically-elected government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan; and

(2) end the outdated practice of referring to the government in Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities”.

(b) NO RESTRICTIONS ON BILATERAL INTERACTIONS.—Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any undue restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State or other Federal departments and agencies to interact directly and routinely with their counterparts in the government in Taiwan.

SEC. 103. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term “official purposes” means—

(1) the wearing of official uniforms;

(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; and

(3) appearances on Department of State social media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.

(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or the Foreign Affairs Handbook, or related guidance or policies that, explicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limitations on activities of United States Government personnel, limits the ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to display, for official purposes, symbols of Republic of China sovereignty, including—

(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); and

(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units.

SEC. 104. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DESIGNATION AND REFERENCES TO TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances should—

(1) provide the people of Taiwan with de facto diplomatic treatment equivalent to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities; and

(2) seek to enter into negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to rename the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” in the United States as the “Taiwan Representative Office”.

SEC. 203. JOINT ASSESSMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish and maintain a joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan that convenes on a recurring basis—

(1) to develop a joint assessment of, and coordinate planning with respect to, the threats Taiwan faces from the People’s Republic of China across the spectrum of possible military action; and

(2) to identify nonmaterial and material solutions to deter and, if necessary, defeat such threats.

(b) INTEGRATED PRIORITIES LIST.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop with Taiwan—

(1) an integrated priorities list;

(2) relevant plans for acquisition and training for relevant nonmaterial and material solutions; and

(3) other measures to appropriately prioritize the defense needs of Taiwan to maintain effective deterrence across the spectrum of possible military action by the People’s Republic of China.

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the joint assessment developed pursuant to subsection (a)(1).

SEC. 204. MODERNIZING TAIWAN’S SECURITY CAPABILITIES TO DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFEAT AGGRESSION BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(3) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required under paragraph (2) shall include—

(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;

(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counterintervention capabilities, including—

(i) long-range precision fires;

(ii) integrated air and missile defense systems;

(iii) anti-ship cruise missiles;

(iv) land-attack cruise missiles;

(v) coastal defense;

(vi) anti-armor;

(vii) undersea warfare;

(viii) survivable swarming maritime assets;

(ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems;

(x) mining and countermining capabilities;

(xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;

(xii) command and control systems; and

(xiii) any other defense capabilities that the United States and Taiwan jointly determine are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, in accordance with the process developed pursuant to section 203(a);

(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;

(D) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including—

(i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces;

(ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and

(iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;

(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan Reserve Command can recruit, train, and equip its forces;

(F) an evaluation of—

(i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;

(ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and

(iii) the efforts made by the government in Taiwan to address such shortages;

(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;

(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, and energy;

(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security of civilian government and military networks;

(J) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;

(K) a description of cooperative efforts between the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); and

(L) a description of any resistance within the government in Taiwan and the military leadership of Taiwan to—

(i) implementing the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I); or

(ii) United States’ support or engagement with regard to such matters.

(B) MAXIMUM OBLIGATIONS.—Gross obligations for the principal amounts of loans authorized under subparagraph (A) may not exceed $2,000,000,000.

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan Foreign Military Finance grant assistance—

(A) $250,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

(B) $750,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

(C) $1,500,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;

(D) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2026; and

(E) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2027.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS REGARDING DEFINITION OF COUNTER INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES.

(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to ensure that requests by Taiwan to purchase arms from the United States are not prematurely rejected or dismissed before Taiwan submits a letter of request or other formal documentation, particularly when such requests are for capabilities that are not included on any United States Government priority lists of necessary capabilities for the defense of Taiwan; and

(2) to ensure close consultation among representatives of Taiwan, Congress, industry, and the Executive branch about requests referred to in paragraph (1) and the needs of Taiwan before Taiwan submits formal requests for such purchases.

(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

(1) a list of categories of counter intervention capabilities and a justification for each such category; and

(2) a description of the degree to which the United States has a policy of openness or flexibility for the consideration of capabilities that may not fall within the scope of counter intervention capabilities included in the list required under paragraph (1), due to potential changes, such as—

(A) the evolution of defense technologies;

(B) the identification of new concepts of operation or ways to employ certain capabilities; and

(C) other factors that might change assessments by the United States and Taiwan of what constitutes counter intervention capabilities.

(c) FORM.—The report required in this section shall be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 206. COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—

(1) achieve interoperability;

(2) familiarize the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other; and

(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The training program should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.

(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified report that describes all training provided to the armed forces of Taiwan in the prior fiscal year, including a description of how such training—

(1) achieved greater interoperability;

(2) familiarized the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other; and

(3) improved Taiwan’s defense capabilities.

SEC. 207. ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN’S NEEDS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND RESILIENCE.

(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and other cabinet Secretaries, as appropriate, shall submit a written assessment, with a classified annex, of Taiwan’s needs in the areas of civilian defense and resilience to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall—

(1) analyze the potential role of Taiwan’s public and civilian assets in defending against various scenarios for foreign militaries to coerce or conduct military aggression against Taiwan;

(2) carefully analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing its defensive capabilities through the support of civilians and civilian sectors, including—

(A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high tech labor force;

(B) the creation of clear structures and logistics support for civilian defense role allocation;

(C) recruitment and skills training for Taiwan’s defense and civilian sectors;

(D) strategic stockpiling of resources related to critical food security and medical supplies; and

(E) other defense and resilience needs and considerations at the provincial, city, and neighborhood levels;

(3) analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resiliency among its people and in key economic sectors;

(4) identify opportunities for Taiwan to enhance communications at all levels to strengthen trust and understanding between the military, other government departments, civilian agencies and the general public, including—

(A) communications infrastructure necessary to ensure reliable communications in response to a conflict or crisis; and

(B) a plan to effectively communicate to the general public in response to a conflict or crisis; and

(5) identify the areas and means through which the United States could provide training, exercises, and assistance at all levels to support the needs discovered through the assessment and fill any critical gaps where capacity falls short of such needs.

SEC. 212. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN AS A MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally, as defined in section 644(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403(q) et seq.), for the purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), section 2350a of title 10, United States Code, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), or any other provision o

SEC. 214. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a critical component of United States security assistance that promotes improved capabilities of the military forces of allied and friendly countries and closer cooperation between the United States Armed Forces and such military forces;

(2) it is in the national interest of the United States and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) to further strengthen the military forces of Taiwan, particularly—

(A) to enhance the defensive capabilities of such forces; and

(B) to improve interoperability of such forces with the United States Armed Forces; and

(3) the government in Taiwan—

(A) should be authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program; and

(B) should encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders of Taiwan to participate in such training program and promote successful graduates to positions of prominence in the military forces of Taiwan.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM.—Taiwan is authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program for the following purposes:

(1) To train future leaders of Taiwan.

(2) To establish a rapport between the United States Armed Forces and the military forces of Taiwan to build partnerships for the future.

(3) To enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan.

(4) To promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights in Taiwan.

(5) To foster a better understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan.

SEC. 301. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—

(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and

(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—

(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of the government in Taiwan and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

(B) assistance to enhance the government in Taiwan’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and

(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;

(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations;

(4) the establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the American Institute in Taiwan’s Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded governments to share data and best practices with the government in Taiwan regarding ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and

(5) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.

SEC. 405. CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758 (XXVI).

Section 2(a) of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)—

“(A) established the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations;

“(B) did not address the issue of representation and meaningful participation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or in any related organizations; and

“(C) did not take a position on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.

“(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people of Taiwan.”.

SEC. 605. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the Taiwan Fellowship Program (referred to in this section as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 years for eligible United States citizens. The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.

(b) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated pursuant to section 608(a) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.

(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State or the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with, as appropriate, the implementing partner, should award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—

(A) approximately 5 fellowships during the first 2 years of the Program; and

(B) approximately 10 fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.

(c) AMERICAN INSTITUTION IN TAIWAN AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, should—

(1) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the government in Taiwan; and

(2) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—

(A) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

(B) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

(d)2 During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this title, should work in

(B) an organization outside of the government in Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow is or had been employed.

(f) SUNSET.—The fellowship program under this title shall terminate 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 607. TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than 2 years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this title, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the government in Taiwan or an organization described in section 605(d)(2)(B).

(2) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—

(A) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least 4 years (or at least 2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year or shorter) unless the detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and

(B) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan, or the United States Government agency, as appropriate, any additional expenses incurred by the Federal Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

SEC. 803. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN TAIWAN.

 

 

SEC. 804. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. SEC. 806. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 807 on any foreign person that the President determines, while acting for or on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, knowingly—

(1) ordered or engaged directly in activities interfering significantly in a democratic process in Taiwan; or

(2) with the objective of destabilizing Taiwan, engaged directly in, or ordered—

(A) malicious, offensive cyber-enabled activities targeting—

(i) the Government or armed forces of Taiwan; or

(ii) the critical infrastructure, including military, industrial, or financial infrastructure of Taiwan;

(B) significant economic practices intended to coerce or intimidate—

(i) the government in Taiwan; or

(ii) businesses, academic, or civil society institutions located in Taiwan; or

(C) military activities that are designed to intimidate the armed forces of Taiwan or that seek to normalize a coercive military posture and sustained presence by the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait.

(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (a) if the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written determination that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 903. STUDY.

(ii) additional qualified persons to serve as detailees to or employees of the Center, including—

(I) from any other relevant Federal department or agencies, to include the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development;

(II) qualified foreign service nationals or locally engaged staff who are considered citizens of Taiwan; and

TITLE X—SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA SEA SANCTIONS ACT

SEC. 1005. REPORT ON COUNTRIES THAT RECOGNIZE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST CHINA SEA.

Taiwanese don’t want to declare independence. DPP is now controlling Taiwan Province, they could try, but did not!

The ROC constitution requires a vote for a constitutional amendment in order to change the status of Taiwan Island. Until then, it is simply a province of China, according to the ROC/Taiwan government itself.

The vast majority of people living in the province of Taiwan want to maintain the status quo at the current moment. There is no mandate for independence.

The US wants to push Taiwan province towards independence–against the wishes of its own people–so that it can be weaponized as a forward base of the US Empire (as it was until 1971), and thus serve as the spear point of and as deadly provocation for war against China.

The island of Taiwan is not recognized as a nation by the UN, the US, the EU, NATO, or any country in Asia, in total, or 95% of the world’s population. All understand that Taiwan is part of China. How China can “invade” itself.

Not to beat a dead horse, but also missed, is the fact that Taiwan island is not recognized as an independent nation by itself either.

The nation it claims to be is the Republic of China, and its constitution understands Taiwan Island as a province of China.

The 13 countries that recognize the ROC diplomatically are 1 African state (Eswatini), 4 Central/S. American States (Belize, Guatemala, Paraguay, Honduras) and several small island states in the Caribbean & Pacific (Haiti, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tuvalu).

If you add the total populations of the 8 smaller states (Belize and 7 island states), you come up with a population of less than 1M.

4 of the smaller states (Nauru, Palau, St. Kitts, Tuvalu) have populations of less than 50,000 people–they are the equivalent of towns.

The total population of the world that recognizes Taiwan/ROC is less than the population of Anhui province.

Also significant is the fact that the ROC military on Taiwan island–who are almost all KMT–are strongly opposed to separatism, and it’s unclear whether they would fight the PRC for independence. They see themselves as Chinese, and they respect the mainland for its accomplishments. They have contempt for the Pan-Green/DPP position who see themselves a Japanese-Western-faux indigenous. The indigenous also oppose DPP separatism. At the end of the day, I believe the military will make the final decision.

The price Americans, EU and the world are paying for US proxy war against Russia in Ukraine: Record Bankruptcy in US

Fact-checked might said fake news, Not a complete hoax. As a total list, it’s misleading, but some of the facts are true or at least partially true. by SF Bay Area China Group (20 people went over the list)

The Mall of America hasn’t paid its mortgage in two months https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/the-mall-of-america-hasnt-paid-its-mortgage-in-two-months.html

Birkin maker Hermes to close production sites in France – report https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-hermes-idUSL8N2BA8KP

Hermès Closes Stores till Further Notice – Updates https://www.pursebop.com/boptalk/topic/hermes-closes-all-stores-in-the-usa-till-further-notice

1. Victoria’s Secret declared bankruptcy.
2. Zara closed 1,200 stores.
3. La Chapelle withdrew 4391 stores.
4. Chanel is discontinued.
5. Hermes is discontinued.
6. Patek Philippe discontinued production.
7. Rolex discontinued production.
8. The world’s luxury industry has crumpled.
9. Nike has a total of $23 billion US dollars preparing for the second stage of layoffs.
10. Gold’s gym filed for bankruptcy.
11. The founder of AirBnb said that because of pandemic
    12 years of efforts were destroyed in 6 weeks.
12. Even Starbucks also announced to permanently close their 400 stores.
13. WeWork isn’t in a great spot either
14. Nissan Motor Co. may close down in USA
15. Biggest Car Rental company (Hertz) filed for bankruptcy – they also own Thrifty and Dollar.
16. Biggest Trucking company (Comcar) filed for bankruptcy – they have 4000 trucks.
17. Oldest retail company (JC Penny) filed for bankruptcy – to be acquired by Amazon for pennies.
18. Biggest investor in the world (Warren Buffet) lost $50B in the last 2 months.
19. Biggest investment company in the world (BlackRock) is signalling disaster in the world economy – they manage over $7 Trillion.
20. Biggest mall in America (Mall of America) stopped paying mortgage payments.
21. Most reputable airline in the world (Emirates) laying off 30% of its employees.
22. US Treasury printing trillions to try to keep the economy on life support.
23. Estimated no. of retail stores closing in 2020 – 12,000 to 15,000.

The following are big retailers that have announced closing 100s of shops laying of 10s of thousands of workers while the 1% American elites, US Politicians and the military industrial complex are laughing to the bank everyday in the name of democracy human rights and rules of laws:

• J. Crew
• Gap
• Victoria’s Secret
• Bath & Body Works
• Forever 21
• Sears
• Walgreens
• GameStop
• Pier 1 Imports
• Nordstrom
• Papyrus
• Chico’s
• Destination Maternity
• Modell’s
• A.C. Moore
• Macy’s
• Bose
• Art Van Furniture
• Olympia Sports
• K Mart
• Specialty Cafe & Bakery
  and many many more

Unemployment claims reached an all-time high of 38+ million – unemployment is over 25% (out of 160 million of work force, close to 40 million are jobless).

With no income, consumer demand is falling drastically and the economy will go into a free fall.

This is USA

This Hong Kong style Egg Tarts are comparable to those in HK in terms of taste. You can find it in Oakland Chinatown. The one in San Francisco Chinatown is more expensive and they don’t always open for biz.

Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke at the 22nd Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on Friday in the Uzbek city of Samarkand. Here are some of the key quotes from his speech.

Queen Elizabeth could leave a legacy of the highest moral standards for mankind by returning all the stolen treasures from China, India, African Continent upon her death, but she did not! 伊麗莎白女王可以在她死後歸還所有從中國、印度、非洲大陸偷來的寶藏，為人類留下最高的道德標準, 但她沒有.

After the death of the Queen, South Africa & India urged the British royal family to return the treasures; when will the large number of looted Chinese cultural relics in the British Museum be returned to China 英女王去世後，南非和印度敦促英國王室歸還寶藏； 大英博物館被掠奪的大量中國文物何時歸還中國

Chinese History 關於中國歷史: Total affirmation or negation of a generation (dynasty) is not the right mindset to learn history, because every generation has it’s own characteristics and limitations. 全面肯定或否定某個朝代，都不是學習歷史的正確心態，因為每個朝代都有他的特點和局限.

Chinese-Americans More Likely to be Hired to Lead Troubled Companies. Using Chinese Brains when needed (temporary suspending the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Acts), discarding it when done the good old Americans way! 在需要中國人時(暫時中止1882年的排華法案) 按照美國老方法用完即棄! https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2018/09/asian-americans-companies 有事鍾無艷，無事夏迎春.

No more force quarantine in Hong Kong from November 2022? Have you bought your airline tickets yet? Once confirmed, expect ticket price to shoot up due to limited seat available! 2022年11月起香港不再強制隔離？ 你買機票了嗎？ 一旦確認，由於座位有限，預計票價會大幅上漲