Taiwan Policy Act – US Proxy War Against China in Taiwan Province. 美國台灣政策法 – 美國要在中國台灣省對中國發動代理人戰爭 By JH – SF Bay Area China Group, Oct 14 2022

We have been following quite a few Chinese language KOLs based in Taiwan, HK and China around the issue of possible war over Taiwan. These folks paid close attention to the reactions in Taiwan and China to the US playing the Taiwan card. Set out below is a synthesis of my understanding of their views, which hopefully will be helpful in our work. The issue of potential war over Taiwan is set out in question and answer format that may suit an interview. Or they can be viewed as presentation topics on this issue. The rest of this document provides a background for this issue.

1. Why are we worried about a possible US supported war with China over Taiwan?

Because the US has been extremely provocative towards China over the Taiwan issue, in an apparent attempt to provoke a PLA attack on Taiwan that would result in a Ukraine style proxy war. The only goal is to weaken China and slow down its progress which will otherwise let China overtake the US in the near future.

The US either has or is in the process of changing its policy from one of only milking the Taiwan issue to get remuneration both from the Taiwan government and concessions from China, to one of aggressively changing the status quo, to provoke China into a proxy war. In addition, it is in a hurry to take control of key chip maker TSMC, and relocate all of its resources to the US, plus other high tech Taiwan assets it can get its hands on.

2. How has the US been provocative towards China over Taiwan?

The US has been chipping away at the One China Policy which it agreed to by signing the three successive bilateral communiques and agreements with China since 1972. Under the One China Policy, there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China. The future of Taiwan should be resolved by the Chinese people across the Taiwan Straits in their own way and in their own time.

Until a few years ago, the US had been very restrained in any kind of official visits or official relations in general with Taiwan. This all changed with Trump and now Biden. Nancy Pelosi, the number three person in command after Biden and Harris, officially visited Taiwan last August. President Biden said four times that the US would defend Taiwan should China attack Taiwan.

Contrary to the agreements it signed with China, the US has increased arms sales to Taiwan, been training its military against China, and inching towards a recognition of Taiwan as an independent sovereign state in all but name.

The US Congress is fast tracking the Taiwan Policy Act that is extremely belligerent towards China. Taiwan would gain under the Act almost all of the official status of a sovereign state, such as the naming of offices, without calling it a formal recognition. Under the Act, the US will involve itself extensively in the government and the military of Taiwan, to the extent that US government employees will be embedded in the Taiwan government for the next 7 years, to help determine and implement a wide range of Taiwan’s policies. These policies address fine details in recruitment and skills training for Taiwan’s defense and civilian sectors and strategic stockpiling of resources. All in a mobilization of all of Taiwan’s resources against the PRC.

The Act provides Taiwan with massive military aid, and seeks to establish interoperability between the US and Taiwanese militaries in the form of Joint US-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises and war games against the PRC.

3. What is the military policy the US has in mind for Taiwan?

The US plans to implement a “porcupine” strategy for Taiwan in a US backed proxy war, without committing US troops to defend Taiwan. This strategy is aimed to make Taiwan a tough one for China to swallow and govern after the Taiwan government inevitably falls. Everyone in Taiwan will be made a potential combatant in a war with China, with soldiers and military gear embedded in civilian quarters in a city guerilla warfare style setup to inflict maximum damage on the PLA, and to increase the difficulty of governance by the PRC afterwards. No concern is shown for Taiwan civilian casualties. As in Ukraine, this will yield the maximum benefit to the US while committing the least US resources.

4. How does this proposed “porcupine” strategy for Taiwan differ from the present Taiwan military strategy should China attack?

The present Taiwan military strategy since the days of the KMT is to strike at the PLA naval force while it is crossing the Taiwan Straits and landing, and if that fails, at the PLA beach heads after landing. Taiwan has only a narrow strip of level land where most of its population lives, located west of a high north-to-south mountain range, with little room for military maneuver if the PLA is allowed to land. If the above military strategy fails, the Taiwan government plans to surrender to avoid civilian casualties.

The US “porcupine” strategy deemphasizes striking the PLA while it is crossing the Taiwan Straits, at landing, and focuses instead on hand-to-hand combat with the PLA after landing with small arms, and light mobile missiles and other anti tank weapons. For this purpose, the US is now even vetoing the arms request of the Taiwan military for its present military strategy, and controlling the arms purchases by the Taiwan government, emphasizing the arms for this “porcupine” strategy. In view of the fact that it would be difficult to supply an island after the war begins, the US is already planning to stockpile sufficient arms in Taiwan for an extended war.

The Taiwan military, especially the old guard groomed during the KMT years, may not agree with this new US aggressive defense posture. We will see whether the DPP will comply.

5. What else is the US planning to attack China should a war ensue over Taiwan?

The Taiwan Policy Act contains extensive sections of sanctions on Chinese leaders and financial institutions. One can expect more sanctions should such a war ensue.

6. What has been China’s response to the recent US aggressive moves?

China has been using its utmost effort to unify with Taiwan peacefully, and has treated Taiwan people very well (more about this below). Force is directed only at a small group of secessionists and separatists, and at foreign interference in Taiwan.

But China’s patience in view of the continued US provocations has been exhausted and it recently demonstrated its ability to effectively blockade Taiwan, to show China’s determination to unify with Taiwan, peacefully if possible, but by other means if necessary. Over 170 countries of the world support China’s stand.

7. Do the people of Taiwan want reunification or the status quo?

A majority want the status quo; only a minority want independence. When Taiwan returned from being a Japanese colony to China in 1945, the people of Taiwan welcomed the Chinese troops in droves and they regarded themselves as Chinese. The constitution of Taiwan called the Republic of China (ROC) to this day regards all of China as its territory, with Taiwan as part of China. When the DPP came to power it carried an extensive de-Sinification campaign over the last 20-30 years, causing a substantial increase in the number of people in Taiwan who no longer identify themselves as Chinese. This is true especially among the young, because of the indoctrination throughout their education. Public opinion turns against the PRC and against reunification.

8. Why is China imposing reunification with Taiwan when a majority of Taiwan people want to maintain the status quo?

First, we need to understand that Taiwan has always been a part of China during recent history. It became separated from the mainland only because of foreign aggression and interference. The reunification with Taiwan is simply a conclusion of an unfinished civil war that started in the 1940s. China’s fight against separatist forces is a fight against secession. China cannot invade Taiwan any more than the North could invade the South in the American civil war. The 14 billion Chinese people feel strongly that reunification with Taiwan is essential to China, and will demand that of every one of its governments.

Most of the countries of the world recognize Taiwan as part of China.

We need to also place the Taiwan conflict in a wider context. China is catching up fast with the US, and is surpassing the US in many areas, including in many technology areas. The US feels the urge to knock out or at least slow China down by provoking a war over Taiwan, while China feels that time is on its side and it can wait out the US on the issue of Taiwan.

While China’s goal is ultimately the reunification with Taiwan, it is confident that it will be able to achieve this eventually and peacefully, after it becomes a stronger nation. Then the people of Taiwan are expected to accept reunification with the mainland. And so it is patient and not imposing its will on Taiwan; it feels time is on its side and it can wait. It is the US that is now anxious and is trying to play the Taiwan card, after all of its other cards turned out to be failures against China. It will not allow the present status quo to continue, as shown by its progressively aggressive moves on Taiwan against China, as a vehicle to weaken China through a proxy war.

China made it clear that it will fight any foreign intervention as well as Taiwan secession. The US cannot expect to escape Scot Free in a US backed war over Taiwan, especially when the US is essentially controlling the Taiwan military and government during such a war. Once the war starts over Taiwan, it may escalate into a direct confrontation between two nuclear powers. Do we want a nuclear holocaust?

BACKGROUND

1. Has Taiwan been a part of China? From Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Taiwan

While it gives a useful history of Taiwan, it is biased where it relies on an obviously biased 1951 State Dept. memo between unnamed persons giving the opinion that the Cairo Declaration did not transfer sovereignty of Taiwan to the PRC. The useful part of this source is set out below:

The history of the island of Taiwan dates back tens of thousands of years to the earliest known evidence of human habitation.[1][2] The sudden appearance of a culture based on agriculture around 3000 BC is believed to reflect the arrival of the ancestors of today’s Taiwanese indigenous peoples.[3] From the late 13th to early 17th centuries, Han Chinese gradually came into contact with Taiwan and started settling there. Named Formosa by Portuguese explorers, the south of the island was colonized by the Dutch in the 17th century whilst the Spanish built a settlement in the north which lasted until 1642. These European settlements were followed by an influx of Hoklo and Hakka immigrants from the Fujian and Guangdong areas of mainland China, across the Taiwan Strait.

In 1662, Koxinga, a loyalist of the Ming dynasty who had lost control of mainland China in 1644, defeated the Dutch and established a base of operations on the island. His descendants were defeated by the Qing dynasty in 1683 and their territory in Taiwan was annexed by the Qing dynasty. The Qing dynasty gradually extended its control over the western plains and northeast of Taiwan in the following two centuries. Under Qing rule, Taiwan’s population became majority Han due to migration from mainland China. The Qing ceded Taiwan and Penghu to the Empire of Japan after losing the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Taiwan experienced industrial growth and became a productive rice and sugar exporting Japanese colony. During the Second Sino-Japanese War it served as a base for launching invasions of China, and later Southeast Asia and the Pacific during World War II. Japanese imperial education was implemented in Taiwan and many Taiwanese fought for Japan in the last years of the war.

Taiwan returned to China in 1945 as the result of the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations that set the world order after WWII. After a loss of over 20 million casualties in WWII and 14 long years of fighting the main thrust of the Japanese Imperial forces, China gained back Taiwan and its surrounding islands.

Most of the people in Taiwan are Chinese immigrants and their offsprings over the last hundreds of years from the southern part of Fujian province of China. The so-called Taiwan language is nothing more than the dialect spoken in this part of Fujian province. The people of Taiwan use the same written language, celebrate the same festivals and are culturally hardly distinguishable from the people on the mainland.

2. How did Taiwan become separated from China again after it was returned to China in 1945?

The Chinese civil war broke out between the US backed KMT led by Chiang Kaishek and the CCP led by Mao in the late 1940s. The CCP won and declared the formation of the PRC in 1949. The KMT fled to Taiwan. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the US sent the 7th fleet to prevent the PRC from unification with Taiwan. The US made Taiwan its unsinkable aircraft carrier and military spearhead for attacking China.

3. Who built Taiwan into the high tech power house that it is today?

The KMT ruled Taiwan as a single-party state for forty years until democratic reforms in the 1980s. The first-ever direct presidential election was held in 1996. During the post-war period, Taiwan experienced rapid industrialization and economic growth known as the “Taiwan Miracle”, and was known as one of the “Four Asian Tigers”. This miracle was achieved by the KMT government. The KMT lured many US trained experienced engineers and managers back to Taiwan to build up its science parks and hightech industries, including the TSMC. Since the so-called democratic reforms in the 1990s, Taiwan’s economy has been treading water, and dropped from number 1 to the last amongst the “Four Asian Tigers”. Wages have stagnated for many years.

4. What has been the US policy towards Taiwan?

After WWII, the US ferried KMT troops to occupy all of the Japanese occupied Chinese territory, including Taiwan and the islands in the South China Sea. At that time, the US had no problem with ROC’s eleven-dash line claim in the SCS. Taiwan then controlled Taiping Island and Scarborough Island in the SCS.

After the KMT was defeated by the CCP in 1949, the US did not immediately support the KMT rule in Taiwan. This changed when the Korean War broke out. The US entered into a mutual defense treaty with the ROC making it an American unsinkable aircraft carrier, and supported the ROC as the only legitimate government representing all of China at the UN. The US instituted a complete scheme to isolate the PRC from the rest of the world outside of the Soviet block.

In the 1970s, in order to get China’s help in disengaging from the losing war in Vietnam, and to counter the USSR, the US broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC on Taiwan, established diplomatic relations with China, abrogated the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and withdrew all its armed forces from Taiwan. The US diplomatic relation with China was achieved through a 7 year long and tough negotiation, where the central issue for China was all along the status of Taiwan. China agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the US only after the US agreed to its One China Policy, where Taiwan is recognized as part of China.

To this day US interference in Taiwan is the key reason why Taiwan is still separated from the PRC. Taiwan is a vassal state of the US. All serious Taiwan presidential candidates must travel to Washington to get a US blessing. Otherwise he/she has no chance of winning. Ruled by the DPP, Taiwan does everything the US wants. For example, Taiwan imports Ractopamine fed pork banned in Taiwan, and is forced by the US not to even label such pork as such.

The US has been treating Taiwan as an ATM. Taiwan has been the dumping ground for obsolete US weapon systems sold at huge markups. The Taiwan Relations Act passed during Reagan contradicted in spirit if not the letter of the three communiques signed between China and the US. But the US saw no problem with using its domestic law to override international agreements that it signed, contrary to international law.

US politicians visit Taiwan to get financial remunerations and pork for their home state or election district. For example, Lindsey Graham and Menendez visited Taiwan recently to force China Airlines to buy 24 Boeings. The DPP duly complied and the government owned Airline held an emergency board meeting to approve the deal.

The US is worried that Taiwan high tech assets that it relies on, such as TSMC, will fall into the hands of the PRC, and is trying to relocate such high tech Taiwan assets to the US asap. The US is forcing TSMC to build the most state of the art fabs in the US. All of the US politicians and officials who visited Taiwan made it the top priority to visit with TSMC management. The US is making contingency plans for this purpose, for example, making a list of key TSMC personnel to evacuate in case of war.

US paranoia about losing TSMC and the recent Beiden chip ban on China caused TSMC and many other Taiwan companies to lose half of their value or more in the stock market.

5. How has the mainland been treating Taiwan?

Mainland China has treated Taiwan and people as its own, and in some cases, preferentially. For example, in 2010, China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a free trade agreement between PRC and Taiwan, that aims to reduce tariffs and commercial barriers between the two sides, as well as improve cross-strait relations. The deal is structured to benefit Taiwan far more than mainland China. The advantage to Taiwan would amount to US$13.8 billion, while mainland China would receive benefits estimated at US$2.86 billion. Mainland China will also open markets in 11 service sectors such as banking, securities, insurance, hospitals and accounting, while Taiwan agreed to offer wider access in seven areas, including banking and movies. Taiwan enjoys over $100 billion USD with the mainland, while running deficits with other major trading partners. More than 1 million Taiwan citizens live on the mainland.

The PRC has been evacuating people from Taiwan where Taiwan has not access or diplomatic relations. China has also helped Taiwan scam victims in Cambodia. See https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1273527.shtml.

The mainland has been very cooperative with Taiwan in many areas: student, cultural exchanges, and disaster relief. Taiwan under the KMT has reciprocated, but the DPP has been very hostile. It banned the export of PPEs to the mainland when COVID broke out while Japan and Korea sent aid. Run mainly as a populist anti China vote getting machine, the DPP has inflamed the Taiwan people, especially the younger generation, against China.

6. The west holds Taiwan as a model of democracy. Is that true?

No. While there are elections in Taiwan, they are noted for extensive election fraud by the DPP. In the March 2004 election, for example, the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won by 0.2 % of the votes by staging a fake shooting to gain sympathy votes. The DPP suppresses opposition parties by selective prosecution, and of any voice critical of the DPP. For example, the KMT leaning CTI News TV station lost its license in 2020. Anyone suggesting a meaningful exchange or reconciliation with the PRC is red baited, leaving no room for discussion. See attached What can mainland Chinese, Singaporeans and Hong Kongers learn from the Taiwanese people’s achievement of democracy?

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What can mainland Chinese, Singaporeans and Hong Kongers learn from the Taiwanese people’s achievement of democracy?
Posted by
Chiu Yu
Year-old answer. Things have deteriorated 10 times since.
PhD in Physical Sciences, Major US UniversityUpdated 9mo
What can mainland Chinese, Singaporeans and Hong Kongers learn from the Taiwanese people’s achievement of democracy?
Nothing! Absolutely nothing!

Or maybe “Democracy is a bad thing”?

I was born and grew up in Taiwan, and have never lived in China, Hong Kong or Singapore. Taiwan has badly botched its experiment in democracy and set a terrible example to the Chinese speaking world.

If you follow Taiwanese news, you would know almost all TV news anchors critical of the government have been forced off the air. In the mean time TV stations aligned with the ruling party DPP all received multiple millions (in USD) directly out of government budgets. Just last week the government even audaciously shut down a highly popular TV channel, the CTI, that has consistently enjoyed number one rating on the island, simply because it is the most fiercely critical of the government. Imagine Trump forcing Chris Cuomo off the air or shutting down CNN! You don’t hear this in the cherry-picking western media because the DPP government takes an anti-China stance that secured itself preferential treatment by the West and a blank cheque to harass, intimidate, and persecute the media, the judiciary, the opposition parties etc. with impunity, not to mention their favorite sport: Looting the government.

The Taiwanese populace are still those docile, resigning, apathetic lambs from the dynastic or colonial days holding their government authorities in awe. The fact that the ruling party is stealing from them in real time does not touch a nerve for some strange reason. It is a completely failed experiment in “democracy” that only Western media love as they need Taiwan as their poster child against China.

Here’s more detail:

Chiu Yu’s answer to Is Taiwan geared up to take on China?

What makes Taiwan stand out today, those economical “achievements”, those world leading electronics and petrochemical industries with attendant superb infrastructure without which its “democracy” would have made it go down the path of India, can all be attributed to the foundations laid in the 1960–1980’s by technocrats in the dictatorial KMT administration. It was these public servants under the one-party authoritarian regime that jump started and nurtured TSMC, the top leading IC foundry in the world, Formosa Plastics, another world leading conglomerate, and countless other industrial and business giants in Taiwan staffed by superbly educated workers thanks to its no-nonsense education system, ahead of its time. Thanks to the reserves accrued under the dictatorial KMT regime, Taiwan can squander its resources through embezzlement and corruption, through mass dumbing-down, in the ensuing decades under “democracy” and still limp along today, although maybe not for long.

When I look at Taiwan today, I don’t see a so called “democracy”. I see a totalitarian kleptocracy devolving into a North Korea!

In a broader perspective related to this question, I have posted another challenge question elsewhere on Quora

Chiu Yu’s answer to Why do many Chinese believe that Western democracy is a plot to make China weak?

to which nobody seems to be able to give a good answer so far. Interested?

Watch this space. I will elaborate further.

Note added on 12/03/2020: Just a couple of days ago I learned about a chicanery played by the ruling DPP party in Taiwan. It takes advantage of the little known difference between political parties in Taiwan, KMT, DPP, etc., which are almost all modeled on the Leninist/Communist doctrine of explicit and rigid party organization structures with a high threshold for membership admission, and those in the West (Democratic, Republican, Social Democrat, ….) with extremely loose party structure and member admission qualifications. The consequence is that, there are very few “card carrying” party members in Taiwan (about 1% of total population), compared to pretty much self-declared party members in the US (more than 30%) who can join or leave a party as they please.

What’s the consequence? In the US it is easy to identify a person’s political leaning by just looking at his party affiliation, and it is easy for many laws to require that government policy advisory/consultation bodies (The national election commission, The federal communication commission, etc.) be formed with an even mix from both parties and expect a pretty impartial panel to rule on things. Also, someone with a strong political inclination would tend to declare a party affiliation for transparency. This is indeed what happened in the US. In Taiwan, 99% of the people don’t have a formal party affiliation, but this does not mean they don’t have strong and highly visible political leanings known to everyone. Many TV anchors who are obsessively pro or anti DPP don’t belong to any party in an official way, for example. The DPP party exploited this fact to form many important government policy advisory/consultation bodies by staffing them 100% with people with no declared party affiliation but are known by everyone on the street to be strongly pro DPP. And YES, in Taiwan the formation of many of these commissions and committees is entirely up to the president, NO need for parliament confirmation.

So on a formal level, all these commissions and committees are represented by people with no partisan leanings. This creates a façade to the international community and to whoever questions the legitimacy of these entities. Hiding under this façade, the DPP has carried out numerous unethical or even illegal agendas successfully. Some examples of these entities (I might not get the exact English names right):

The Central Election Commission. This one sets all the rules and performs all the logistics of Taiwanese elections. The DPP won an incredible landslide in 2020, despite a decisive crushing defeat in 2018 where it lost all the major local elections. What happened? A key factor is the staffing of this commission exclusively by DPP loyalists in 2019, which changed many rules and greatly increased the opacity of the election procedures, not least the computerized vote tallying system. Still to this day nobody really knows what happened.
The National Communication Commission. This is the one that shut down the number one rated TV channel CTI mentioned above, because it was on constant attack of the DPP. It also made sure that basically all news anchors unfriendly to DPP are forced off the air. Feel free to verify this with anyone you know in Taiwan.
Taiwan Truth Verification Center. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, etc. rely on the input of this “independent” organization to determine if someone is posting “fake news” on the web in order to take corrective action. Many people who criticize the DPP government or officials have been suspended by FB, Twitter etc. based on feed from this Center.
The Commission for Justice in Social Transformation （轉型正義委員會）. This one was formed with the explicit aim of persecuting the opposition KMT party. It reached peak notoriety when its head was caught on hidden microphone proudly comparing his committee to the 15th-century Chinese Gestapo （東廠）.
The Taiwanese Supreme Court. Yes I am not joking. This one is entirely nominated by the president and that’s pretty much final. Currently it is nearly 100% made up of DPP fanatics, although not many have official party membership, as I explained. To the outside observer it cannot look more impartial. Another critical difference between the Taiwanese and other country’s legal systems is the fact that all personnel decisions of judges (promotion/demotion, relocation, performance evaluation, etc.) are made within the Judiciary Yuan (司法院), controlled by administration bureaucrats, not practicing judges or independent panels. Likewise all personnel decisions of prosecutors are made by another body of administration bureaucrats (司法行政部). These bureaucrats are comletely beholden to whoever the ruling party is, who has the power to appoint them, thus the careers of Taiwanese judges and prosecutors are entirely in the hands of the Executive Branch! A real travesty! Feel free to confirm with anyone from Taiwan.
The Taiwanese Supreme Court of Administration （最高行政法院）. This handles lawsuits between civilians and the Executive Branch. The current head of the Supreme Court of Administration is the brother-in-law of the president, who was appointed by the president. Go figure. By the way, a critical case of scandals and frauds involving the president, which you might have caught wind of, is moving up the chain of the Courts of Administration right now, which will end up in the hands of this brother-in-law at some point. (This paragraph was added on 09/05/2021).
(Note Added 12/12/2021): Numerous ad hoc committees established to disburse the 55 billion NTD ($1.96 billion USD, this is the newest figure) government budget on media promotion and cyber propaganda. These committees are a smoke screen mechanism to pass on the looted taxpayer money to media outlets and cyber hit squads run by DPP operatives and loyalists. Only those advocating DPP agenda or bashing DPP opponents can get this monery, because these committees are overwhelmingly composed of DPP fanatics or fringe group constituents. Moe detail can be found in these links below.
An Update on Taiwanese “Muzzled Voice” Channels on YouTube

Taiwanese Underground Web Hit Squad (aka 1450) on The DPP Government Payroll

There are numerous other ostensibly “independent” organizations and government bodies, critical to the political ecology in Taiwan, yet exclusively staffed by the Taiwanese president with these dubious DPP fanatics. This is the most treacherous ploy one can imagine, which looks so benign to unsuspecting westerners. Of course I must say, again, even to knowing westerners, Taiwan is needed as their poster child in their anti-China campaign, so why not screw Taiwanese democracy? Why not screw Taiwanese people?

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Note added 10/12/2021

How about a highly convincing allegation of election fraud orchestrated by the ruling DPP party in the 2020 presidential election?

Chiu Yu’s answer to How do you explain that the entire time sequence of vote counts in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election can be reproduced by a simple mathematical formula to the last digit? Please focus on logic and facts, and avoid political rants.

Note added 09/17/2021

Today it was reported that the ruling party, DPP, of Taiwan, is moving to do the following:

Give the government the exclusive right to name the Chair of the Board of the Public TV station in Taiwan.
Increase the power of the National Communications Commission (NCC) to select members for the Board of the Public TV station.
Through chicanery as described above, the DPP already saturated the NCC with 100% party fanatics. This is in sharp contrast to any other democratic country. So the end effect is that the ruling party will have total, unchallenged control of the Public TV in Taiwan. This is unique among all democratic countries.

Note Added 09/01/2021

I found the link to a famous legal scandal that happened in Taiwan, and has not yet reached closure, which epitomizes the uncivilized and undemocratic political reality of Taiwan. The judiciary and legislative arms of the government are manipulated in service of the executive branch, often used as means to settle political or even personal vendetta, at the expense of human rights with little or no consequence. The chief perpetrator in this case, which caused outrage on an international level, Mr Hou Kwan-Ren, is today still a top official in the Taiwanese judicial system, having done the bidding of top dogs in the ruling party.

The link is in Chinese. But if you scroll halfway down, there are YouTube links to more than 20 videos featuring international NGO leaders or political figures expressing outrage about this case in English or other western languages.
https://act1219.org/about-tjmcase.php
https://act1219.org/taijimen-case/
12.8K views273 upvotes16 shares13 comments

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Important Section of Taiwan Policy Act

SEC. 102. TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN TAIWAN.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and other Federal departments and agencies shall—
(1) engage with the democratically-elected government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan; and
(2) end the outdated practice of referring to the government in Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities”.
(b) NO RESTRICTIONS ON BILATERAL INTERACTIONS.—Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any undue restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State or other Federal departments and agencies to interact directly and routinely with their counterparts in the government in Taiwan.

SEC. 103. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.
(a) DEFINED TERM.—In this section, the term “official purposes” means—
(1) the wearing of official uniforms;
(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; and
(3) appearances on Department of State social media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or the Foreign Affairs Handbook, or related guidance or policies that, explicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limitations on activities of United States Government personnel, limits the ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to display, for official purposes, symbols of Republic of China sovereignty, including—
(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); and
(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military units.
SEC. 104. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DESIGNATION AND REFERENCES TO TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances should—
(1) provide the people of Taiwan with de facto diplomatic treatment equivalent to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities; and
(2) seek to enter into negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to rename the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” in the United States as the “Taiwan Representative Office”.
SEC. 203. JOINT ASSESSMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish and maintain a joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan that convenes on a recurring basis—
(1) to develop a joint assessment of, and coordinate planning with respect to, the threats Taiwan faces from the People’s Republic of China across the spectrum of possible military action; and
(2) to identify nonmaterial and material solutions to deter and, if necessary, defeat such threats.
(b) INTEGRATED PRIORITIES LIST.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall develop with Taiwan—
(1) an integrated priorities list;
(2) relevant plans for acquisition and training for relevant nonmaterial and material solutions; and
(3) other measures to appropriately prioritize the defense needs of Taiwan to maintain effective deterrence across the spectrum of possible military action by the People’s Republic of China.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the joint assessment developed pursuant to subsection (a)(1).
SEC. 204. MODERNIZING TAIWAN’S SECURITY CAPABILITIES TO DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFEAT AGGRESSION BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(3) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required under paragraph (2) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to implement a military strategy that will deter and, if necessary, defeat military aggression by the People’s Republic of China, including the steps that Taiwan has taken and the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards such implementation;
(B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and employ within its forces counterintervention capabilities, including—
(i) long-range precision fires;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense systems;
(iii) anti-ship cruise missiles;
(iv) land-attack cruise missiles;
(v) coastal defense;
(vi) anti-armor;
(vii) undersea warfare;
(viii) survivable swarming maritime assets;
(ix) manned and unmanned aerial systems;
(x) mining and countermining capabilities;
(xi) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities;
(xii) command and control systems; and
(xiii) any other defense capabilities that the United States and Taiwan jointly determine are crucial to the defense of Taiwan, in accordance with the process developed pursuant to section 203(a);
(C) an evaluation of the balance between conventional and counter intervention capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of the date on which the report is submitted;
(D) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to enhance the overall readiness of its defense forces, including—
(i) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and providing regular and relevant training to such forces;
(ii) the extent to which such training is realistic to the security environment that Taiwan faces; and
(iii) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such forces;
(E) an assessment of steps taken by Taiwan to ensure that the Taiwan Reserve Command can recruit, train, and equip its forces;
(F) an evaluation of—
(i) the severity of manpower shortages in the military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;
(ii) the impact of such shortages in the event of a conflict scenario; and
(iii) the efforts made by the government in Taiwan to address such shortages;
(G) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to raise awareness among the population of Taiwan of the risks Taiwan faces;
(H) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, including in transportation, telecommunications networks, and energy;
(I) an assessment of the efforts made by Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including the security of civilian government and military networks;
(J) an assessment of any significant gaps in any of the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I) with respect to which the United States assesses that additional action is needed;
(K) a description of cooperative efforts between the United States and Taiwan on the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (J); and
(L) a description of any resistance within the government in Taiwan and the military leadership of Taiwan to—
(i) implementing the matters described in subparagraphs (A) through (I); or
(ii) United States’ support or engagement with regard to such matters.
(B) MAXIMUM OBLIGATIONS.—Gross obligations for the principal amounts of loans authorized under subparagraph (A) may not exceed $2,000,000,000.

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan Foreign Military Finance grant assistance—
(A) $250,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
(B) $750,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
(C) $1,500,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;
(D) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2026; and
(E) $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2027.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS REGARDING DEFINITION OF COUNTER INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES.
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to ensure that requests by Taiwan to purchase arms from the United States are not prematurely rejected or dismissed before Taiwan submits a letter of request or other formal documentation, particularly when such requests are for capabilities that are not included on any United States Government priority lists of necessary capabilities for the defense of Taiwan; and
(2) to ensure close consultation among representatives of Taiwan, Congress, industry, and the Executive branch about requests referred to in paragraph (1) and the needs of Taiwan before Taiwan submits formal requests for such purchases.
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress—
(1) a list of categories of counter intervention capabilities and a justification for each such category; and
(2) a description of the degree to which the United States has a policy of openness or flexibility for the consideration of capabilities that may not fall within the scope of counter intervention capabilities included in the list required under paragraph (1), due to potential changes, such as—
(A) the evolution of defense technologies;
(B) the identification of new concepts of operation or ways to employ certain capabilities; and
(C) other factors that might change assessments by the United States and Taiwan of what constitutes counter intervention capabilities.
(c) FORM.—The report required in this section shall be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 206. COMPREHENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a comprehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—
(1) achieve interoperability;
(2) familiarize the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other; and
(3) improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The training program should prioritize relevant and realistic training, including as necessary joint United States-Taiwan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale military exercises, and an enduring rotational United States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintaining force readiness and utilizing United States defense articles and services transferred from the United States to Taiwan.
(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a classified report that describes all training provided to the armed forces of Taiwan in the prior fiscal year, including a description of how such training—
(1) achieved greater interoperability;
(2) familiarized the militaries of the United States and Taiwan with each other; and
(3) improved Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
SEC. 207. ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN’S NEEDS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND RESILIENCE.
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and other cabinet Secretaries, as appropriate, shall submit a written assessment, with a classified annex, of Taiwan’s needs in the areas of civilian defense and resilience to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The assessment required under subsection (a) shall—
(1) analyze the potential role of Taiwan’s public and civilian assets in defending against various scenarios for foreign militaries to coerce or conduct military aggression against Taiwan;
(2) carefully analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing its defensive capabilities through the support of civilians and civilian sectors, including—
(A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high tech labor force;
(B) the creation of clear structures and logistics support for civilian defense role allocation;
(C) recruitment and skills training for Taiwan’s defense and civilian sectors;
(D) strategic stockpiling of resources related to critical food security and medical supplies; and
(E) other defense and resilience needs and considerations at the provincial, city, and neighborhood levels;
(3) analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resiliency among its people and in key economic sectors;
(4) identify opportunities for Taiwan to enhance communications at all levels to strengthen trust and understanding between the military, other government departments, civilian agencies and the general public, including—
(A) communications infrastructure necessary to ensure reliable communications in response to a conflict or crisis; and
(B) a plan to effectively communicate to the general public in response to a conflict or crisis; and
(5) identify the areas and means through which the United States could provide training, exercises, and assistance at all levels to support the needs discovered through the assessment and fill any critical gaps where capacity falls short of such needs.
SEC. 212. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN AS A MAJOR NON-NATO ALLY.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally, as defined in section 644(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403(q) et seq.), for the purposes of the transfer or possible transfer of defense articles or defense services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), section 2350a of title 10, United States Code, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), or any other provision o
SEC. 214. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a critical component of United States security assistance that promotes improved capabilities of the military forces of allied and friendly countries and closer cooperation between the United States Armed Forces and such military forces;
(2) it is in the national interest of the United States and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) to further strengthen the military forces of Taiwan, particularly—
(A) to enhance the defensive capabilities of such forces; and
(B) to improve interoperability of such forces with the United States Armed Forces; and
(3) the government in Taiwan—
(A) should be authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program; and
(B) should encourage eligible officers and civilian leaders of Taiwan to participate in such training program and promote successful graduates to positions of prominence in the military forces of Taiwan.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM.—Taiwan is authorized to participate in the International Military Education and Training program for the following purposes:
(1) To train future leaders of Taiwan.
(2) To establish a rapport between the United States Armed Forces and the military forces of Taiwan to build partnerships for the future.
(3) To enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operations between the United States and Taiwan.
(4) To promote professional military education, civilian control of the military, and protection of human rights in Taiwan.
(5) To foster a better understanding of the United States among individuals in Taiwan.

SEC. 301. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to—
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s “United Front” work, including activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include descriptions of—
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—
(A) assistance in building the capacity of the government in Taiwan and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;
(B) assistance to enhance the government in Taiwan’s ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference; and
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns;
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities;
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations;
(4) the establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the American Institute in Taiwan’s Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded governments to share data and best practices with the government in Taiwan regarding ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party; and
(5) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda.
SEC. 405. CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758 (XXVI).
Section 2(a) of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) is amended by adding at the end the following:
“(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971)—
“(A) established the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations;
“(B) did not address the issue of representation and meaningful participation of Taiwan and its people in the United Nations or in any related organizations; and
“(C) did not take a position on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.
“(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the consent of the people of Taiwan.”.
SEC. 605. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the Taiwan Fellowship Program (referred to in this section as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 years for eligible United States citizens. The Department of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Program.
(b) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated pursuant to section 608(a) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing partner.
(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State or the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with, as appropriate, the implementing partner, should award to eligible United States citizens, subject to available funding—
(A) approximately 5 fellowships during the first 2 years of the Program; and
(B) approximately 10 fellowships during each of the remaining years of the Program.
(c) AMERICAN INSTITUTION IN TAIWAN AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of State, should—
(1) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an agency of the government in Taiwan; and
(2) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—
(A) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and
(B) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.
(d)2 During the second year of each fellowship under this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Department of State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this title, should work in
(B) an organization outside of the government in Taiwan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow and the agency of the United States Government from which the fellow is or had been employed.
(f) SUNSET.—The fellowship program under this title shall terminate 7 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 607. TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
(a) IN GENERAL.—
(1) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than 2 years, an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has been awarded a fellowship under this title, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the government in Taiwan or an organization described in section 605(d)(2)(B).
(2) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall agree—
(A) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for a period of at least 4 years (or at least 2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year or shorter) unless the detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency; and
(B) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan, or the United States Government agency, as appropriate, any additional expenses incurred by the Federal Government in connection with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from service with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such agency.

SEC. 803. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA RELATING TO OPERATIONS IN TAIWAN.

SEC. 804. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. SEC. 806. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 807 on any foreign person that the President determines, while acting for or on behalf of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, knowingly—
(1) ordered or engaged directly in activities interfering significantly in a democratic process in Taiwan; or
(2) with the objective of destabilizing Taiwan, engaged directly in, or ordered—
(A) malicious, offensive cyber-enabled activities targeting—
(i) the Government or armed forces of Taiwan; or
(ii) the critical infrastructure, including military, industrial, or financial infrastructure of Taiwan;
(B) significant economic practices intended to coerce or intimidate—
(i) the government in Taiwan; or
(ii) businesses, academic, or civil society institutions located in Taiwan; or
(C) military activities that are designed to intimidate the armed forces of Taiwan or that seek to normalize a coercive military posture and sustained presence by the People’s Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait.
(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (a) if the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written determination that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States.
SEC. 903. STUDY.
(ii) additional qualified persons to serve as detailees to or employees of the Center, including—
(I) from any other relevant Federal department or agencies, to include the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development;
(II) qualified foreign service nationals or locally engaged staff who are considered citizens of Taiwan; and

TITLE X—SOUTH CHINA SEA AND EAST CHINA SEA SANCTIONS ACT
SEC. 1005. REPORT ON COUNTRIES THAT RECOGNIZE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SOUTH CHINA SEA OR THE EAST CHINA SEA.