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SCMP: Beijing has condemned Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan, not only as a violation of the one-China principle but also as a challenge to the post-war international order. 香港南華早報: 北京譴責日本首相高市早苗有關台灣的言論，不僅違反一個中國原則，也是對戰後國際秩序的挑戰。

Takaichi suggested on November 7 that Tokyo could respond militarily to a potential attack on the island, making her the first sitting Japanese leader since World War II to publicly link a Taiwan contingency with the possible deployment of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces.

Why does it matter?

Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945, along with the Penghu Islands, after China’s Qing government was forced to cede them under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, or the Treaty of Maguan, signed after China lost the first Sino-Japanese war.

In the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the US, Britain and China stated explicitly that “all the territories Japan [had] stolen from the Chinese” were to be restored, including Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.

The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 reaffirmed this position and set the conditions for Japan’s surrender. Later that year, Japan formally accepted these terms in its surrender instrument.

“Japan has an obligation under international law to observe those documents, which was the prerequisite for Japan to be readmitted to the international community after the war,” ministry spokesman Lin Jian said.

Beijing says the question of Taiwan’s status was effectively settled in 1945, following China’s victory in what it calls the “war of resistance against Japanese aggression” and Japan’s surrender.

How does Ryukyu fit in?

Ryukyu is the ancient Chinese name for a chain of islands that includes Okinawa – under Japan’s administration today but once part of an independent kingdom and tributary state of the Chinese dynasties.

The San Francisco treaty – which Beijing claims is invalid – put the Ryukyu Islands under the temporary administration of the United States, which handed the authority to Japan in 1972.

According to state media and some scholars in China, the 1972 action violated the UN Trusteeship Council’s fundamental principles on national self-determination, leaving the sovereign status of the Ryukyu Islands unresolved under international law.

“China stressed the undetermined status of the Ryukyu Islands on top of reaffirming that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China,” Yu wrote in an article published by the state-owned Beijing Daily on Tuesday.

“This is a concrete manifestation of proactively transforming academic discourse into strategic initiative, which helps to foster a correct understanding of historical issues worldwide and enhances collective vigilance against Japan’s right-wing forces.”

11月7日，高市早苗暗示日本可能對潛在的台海衝突作出軍事回應，這使她成為二戰後首位公開將台灣事態與日本自衛隊可能部署聯繫起來的日本現任領導人。

為什麼這件事很重要？

1895年至1945年，台灣和澎湖群島曾是日本的殖民地，當時中國清政府在中日甲午戰爭戰敗後，被迫通過《馬關條約》將其割讓。

在1943年的《開羅宣言》中，美國、英國和中國明確表示，”日本所竊取於中國之領土”必須歸還，包括台灣和澎湖群島。

1945年的《波茨坦公告》重申了這一立場，並為日本投降設定了條件。同年晚些時候，日本在投降書中正式接受了這些條件。

外交部發言人林劍表示：”根據國際法，日本有義務遵守這些文件，這是日本戰後重新被國際社會接納的前提。”

北京方面表示，台灣的地位問題在1945年已得到有效解決，此前中國在抗日戰爭中取得勝利，日本投降。

琉球與此有何關係？

琉球是一串島嶼的古中國名稱，其中包括沖繩——如今由日本管轄，但曾是獨立王國和中國朝代的藩屬國。

《舊金山和約》將琉球群島置於美國的臨時管轄之下，美國於1972年將管轄權移交給日本。北京聲稱該條約無效。

根據中國官方媒體和一些學者的說法，1972年的行動違反了聯合國託管理事會關於民族自決的基本原則，使得琉球群島的主權地位在國際法上仍未解決。

官方媒體《北京日報》11月12日發表的一篇文章中寫道：”中國在重申台灣是中國不可分割的一部分的同時，強調了琉球群島地位未定的事實。這正是積極將學術話語轉化為戰略主動的具體表現，有助於在世界範圍內正確認識歷史問題，並增強對日本右翼勢力的集體警惕。”

Nury Vittachi: As soon as the U.S. said their reason for the second strike to take out survivors was “self-defence”, I knew I had to do a cartoon 努里·維塔奇：美國聲稱第二次打擊倖存者的理由是「自衛」時，我就知道我必須畫一幅漫畫

Smoking bad and not drinking bad too, both could cost your jobs! 吸煙不好，不喝酒也不好，這兩種情況都可能讓你丟掉工作!

One of Hong Kong’s major property developers has finally adopted a strict no-smoking policy across all construction sites. Anyone who violates the rule will face fines—and even dismissal. 香港一家主要地產發展商終於在其所有建築工地實施嚴格的禁菸政策。任何違規者都將面臨罰款，甚至被解僱.

This reminded me of a policy implemented by one of Hong Kong’s largest food groups: a complete ban on smoking for all chefs and kitchen staff. The reason is simple—smoking dulls the taste buds. If you’ve ever eaten at a restaurant where the dishes were excessively salty, there’s a good chance the chef or cook was a smoker.

Interestingly, the same food group also enforces another unusual rule: in all of their fine-dining restaurants, servers are required to drink or at least learn to drink after they are hired. Those who refuse may lose their jobs. In the restaurant industry, alcohol sales often match—or even exceed—food sales in profitability. A server who does not drink is far less likely to encourage customers to order wine or cocktails, which directly impacts revenue.

這讓我想起香港某大型餐飲集團推行的一項規定：全面禁止所有廚師及廚房員工吸菸。理由很簡單——吸菸會使味蕾遲鈍。如果你曾在外用餐時覺得菜餚異常鹹，那麼廚師或烹調者很可能有吸菸習慣。

有趣的是，同一餐飲集團還執行了另一條特殊規定：在其所有高級餐廳，服務員入職後必須飲酒，或至少學習飲酒。拒絕配合者可能失去工作。在餐飲行業中，酒水銷售的利潤往往與菜品相當，甚至更高。不飲酒的服務員很難鼓勵顧客點選葡萄酒或雞尾酒，這將直接影響營收。

American logistic expert report from China video: China’s export juggernaut: low prices and booming trade to rest of world, while Americans buy less 影片有中文字幕: 中國出口巨獸：在全球市場以低價狂飆，美國人卻買得更少

https://rumble.com/v72lnso-chinas-export-juggernaut-low-prices-and-booming-trade-to-rest-of-world-whil.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP8U4uPHu/

High tariffs in the United States resulted in a sharp $38 billion reduction in Chinese imports in the 3rd quarter, compared to the same period in 2024.

Americans are buying less of almost everything from China, and either paying more or going without for products sourced elsewhere.

But China has more than offset their deep losses in the American market, with booming exports to the rest of the world.

The biggest beneficiaries of the trade wars may be the developing world, as Chinese export companies have ramped up business in Africa, South America, and South Asia.

Though Chinese firms do not enjoy the high per-unit profit margins they get from American buyers, they are selling in much larger volumes to these new markets.

Closing scene, Huizhou, Guangdong

美國的高關稅導致 2025 年第三季度中國對美出口大減，與 2024 年同期相比縮水了 380 億美元。

美國人現在幾乎什麼中國商品都買得更少，轉而以更高價格購買替代品，或乾脆不買。

但中國已透過對世界其他地區的蓬勃出口，完全抵消在美國市場的巨大損失。

在這場貿易戰中，最大的受益者可能是發展中國家，因為中國出口企業正大幅拓展在非洲、南美洲和南亞的業務。

雖然中國企業在這些新市場的單件利潤不及美國買家，但憑藉更大的銷售量，仍實現強勁增長。

最後畫面：廣東惠州

Video with Chinese subtitles: How Can a $15M Missile Challenge a $13B U.S. Carrier?! 影片有中文字幕: 一枚 1,500 萬美元的飛彈，如何挑戰 130 億美元的美國航母？！

https://rumble.com/v72lafe-how-can-a-15m-missile-challenge-a-13b-u.s.-carrier.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP8U4RjV6/

China’s newest long-range missile systems have created global discussion by challenging the traditional role of the U.S. Navy’s $13 billion aircraft carriers.

These precision missiles, reportedly costing around $15 million, combine extended reach, guidance updates, and high mobility to influence how close carriers can operate in the Pacific. Their real impact, however, depends on whether China can maintain accurate tracking on moving vessels across vast ocean areas. Meanwhile, the United States continues advancing layered defenses, electronic support, and distributed carrier operations to stay ahead.

In this episode, we explain how China’s $15M missile systems work, why they matter, how targeting networks influence their effectiveness, and what this evolving technology race means for the future of maritime strategy and carrier operations.

Watch to understand the full picture behind this $15M vs. $13B challenge.

中國最新的遠程飛彈系統因挑戰美國海軍造價 130 億美元的航空母艦傳統角色，而在全球引發熱烈討論。

這些精準飛彈據稱成本約 1,500 萬美元，結合超遠射程、導引更新與高機動性，正在影響美國航母在太平洋可接近的作戰距離。然而，它們的真正效能取決於中國能否在廣闊海域中，持續對高速移動的艦艇保持精準追蹤。同時，美國也持續發展分層防禦、電子支援與分散式航母作戰，以保持領先優勢。

在本期節目中，我們將解釋中國這款「1,500 萬美元飛彈系統」的運作方式、其重要性、目標定位網絡如何影響其有效性，以及這場持續演化的技術競賽將如何改變未來的海上戰略與航母運用。

觀看本影片，了解「1,500 萬美元 vs. 130 億美元」背後的完整故事。

HOW CHINA OUTSMARTED U.S. ON DRONE EXPORTS 《中國如何在無人機出口上智勝美國》

Chinese leader Xi Jinping is meeting French equivalent Emmanuel Macron in Beijing today.

But the Le Monde newspaper was quick to criticize the host country.

“China continues to deliver drone parts that give Moscow an advantage on the ground,” it says. In other words, the report gives the false impression that China is supporting Russia’s war efforts, as other western mainstream media have said.

The report raised the eyebrows of French author and China specialist Laurent Michelon, who has been tracking the issue.

He realized that this misrepresented the position of China—which has been carefully allowing both sides in the Ukraine war to buy drone parts, so that it can stay neutral.

“The reality is far more complex, and Le Monde would like you to ignore the fact that in 2024, almost 97% of Ukraine’s drone-related imports came also from China,” Laurent said in a post on X.

But after the issue came to light, the story became even more curious, he said.

The US pressurized China, which is the world capital of drone design and production, to reduce the sale of drone parts to Russia.

China obediently did what the US asked.

And then, to stay neutral, the Chinese reduced their drone exports to Ukraine!

Well played.

中國領導人習近平今日在北京會晤法國總統馬克·宏。但法國《世界報》迅速對東道國提出批評，稱「中國持續提供無人機零件，使俄羅斯在戰場上獲得優勢」。換言之，該報導與其他西方主流媒體論調相似，營造出中國支持俄羅斯戰爭行動的錯誤印象。

這篇報導令長期關注此議題的法國作家兼中國問題專家羅朗·米歇隆深感詫異。他意識到這嚴重曲解了中國的立場——中國始終謹慎地允許烏克蘭衝突雙方購買無人機零件，以保持中立態勢。

「現實遠比這複雜，《世界報》顯然希望人們忽略一個事實：2024年烏克蘭近97%的無人機相關進口同樣源自中國。」羅朗在X平台上發文指出。但他表示此事曝光後，事態發展愈加耐人尋味。

美國曾向全球無人機設計生產中心的中國施壓，要求減少對俄無人機零件銷售。中方順從了美方要求。隨後，為維持中立立場，中國竟同步削減了對烏克蘭的無人機出口！

真是高明。

Possible Outcomes of What Ming Pao Calls the “2025 China–Japan Diplomatic Confrontation” — Based on Ming Pao and Other Public Reports/Commentaries

🔎 Origins of the Conflict and Current Situation (Quick Overview)
• The confrontation began when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in parliament on November 7, 2025, that if China used force against Taiwan, Japan might consider military involvement under the framework of collective self-defense — a remark Beijing viewed as a serious provocation.
• China immediately launched a series of countermeasures, including diplomatic protests, tightened media and social controls, travel and study-abroad warnings, bans or restrictions on Japanese seafood imports, and calls urging Chinese citizens to avoid traveling to Japan.
• Despite escalating rhetoric and diplomatic tension, there has been no immediate collapse on the economic and trade front; the long-standing pattern of “cold politics, hot economics” continues to hold.

Based on this, the two countries are in a state of high confrontation, but there has been no full diplomatic rupture or military clash — meaning there are multiple possible ways the situation could end.

📈 Five Possible End-Game Scenarios

Below are several outcomes or trends that appear plausible — each dependent on current political, economic, and geopolitical variables.

1. Cooling Off / Partial De-escalation — Tension Remains but Full Confrontation Avoided
   Economic interests and trade interdependence will push both sides to avoid a total breakdown. Japan may tone down certain sensitive remarks, while China may maintain sanctions but refrain from major escalation.
   The result: diplomatic “cooling,” with limited but continued interaction — especially in the economic and commercial sphere.
2. Prolonged Stalemate, Continuing the “Political–Economic Separation” Model
   Even if political confrontation continues, economic and people-to-people exchanges (business, tourism, culture) may partially resume or continue.
   However, official and high-level political engagement will be restricted.
   The bilateral relationship remains cool for the long term but does not completely collapse.
3. Limited Japanese Concessions (Verbal / Diplomatic Gestures) in Exchange for De-escalation
   If the Japanese government (or the prime minister herself) believes the diplomatic and economic costs have become too high, Tokyo may make tactical “adjustments,” such as issuing diplomatic statements, softening its Taiwan-related rhetoric, or making partial compromises to ease tensions.
4. Continued Chinese Pressure — Expanded Countermeasures / Institutionalized “Punitive Mechanisms”
   If Beijing believes Japan’s statements touch too deeply on China’s core interests (especially Taiwan and sovereignty), China may normalize or escalate sanctions and restrictions, or take tougher actions against Japanese companies, investments, and cultural exchanges.
   The relationship would shift into a long-term adversarial / containment mode.
5. Influenced by Third Parties / Geopolitical Shifts — Possible Reconciliation or Reset
   If the United States, France, or other major powers act as mediators or apply pressure — or if Asia’s broader security/economic landscape shifts (e.g., new regional security initiatives, reconfigured economic cooperation) — a new round of diplomacy could emerge.
   This may reset the relationship, bringing it back to a pre-crisis but stable state.

🧮 Key Factors That Matter Most
• Political and Rhetorical “Red Lines”:
For Beijing, Taiwan is a core sovereignty issue. If Japan continues making public statements about “intervention” or “military involvement,” confrontation could flare up again. Japan toning down its rhetoric is a prerequisite for de-escalation.
• Economic and Trade Interdependence:
After years of mutual trade, investment, and supply-chain integration, both sides benefit from economic ties. This interdependence is a major force preventing extreme confrontation.
• Role of Major Powers and Regional Security Dynamics:
External actors (such as the U.S. and European countries) and their positions on Taiwan and Asian security can significantly shape China–Japan interactions — either as mediators or as pressure sources.
• Domestic Political Pressures and Public Opinion:
Both governments must weigh domestic sentiment and nationalism. Strong domestic support for hardline stances can make compromise more difficult.

🎯 Most Likely Outcome: Cold Politics, Hot Economics + Long-Term Stalemate

Overall, the most probable trajectory is a cooled but entrenched stalemate — neither a full breakdown nor quick reconciliation.

More specifically:
• The two sides will not easily return to the normal, close engagement seen in 2023–2024.
• Economic/trade/business interactions may partially recover or continue, but official political and security cooperation will sharply decrease.
• China–Japan relations will enter a new “normal”: avoiding sensitive issues, maintaining low-profile exchanges, yet still vulnerable to sudden diplomatic or economic flare-ups.

✅ Key Turning Points / Indicators to Watch

To determine whether the conflict is ending or escalating, pay special attention to:
• Whether Japan or its leadership clearly tones down or re-clarifies its stance on “a Taiwan contingency / collective self-defense.”
• Whether China lifts its restrictions on Japanese seafood, tourism, and cultural exchanges — or expands such measures.
• Whether the U.S., Europe, or regional actors intervene through mediation, security proposals, or actions affecting the Taiwan Strait.
• Whether economic data, trade flows, or investment patterns show sharp declines — reduced interdependence could accelerate a diplomatic reset or, conversely, deepen confrontation.

明報 所稱「中日外交衝突2025」可能如何收場的幾種情境／分析 — 基於明報及其他公開報道／評論。 

🔎 衝突起因與現況（速覽）
• 衝突起點是日本首相 高市早苗 於 2025年11月7日在國會中發言，指出若中國對台灣動武，日本可能考慮出兵，觸及「集體自衛權」—被北京視為嚴重挑釁。 
• 中國立即做出多種反制，包括外交抗議、社會／媒體管控、旅遊與留學警示、禁止或限制日本水產品進口、呼籲中國公民避免赴日等。 
• 雖然言論與外交關係緊張，但經貿層面並未立刻見到崩潰；過去多年「政治冷、經濟熱」的格局曾持續。 

基於此，目前雙邊是高度對峙狀態，但尚未全面「斷交」或發生軍事衝突 — 這意味著未來的「收場」有多種可能。

📈 五種可能的「收場」情境

以下是幾種比較可能的結果／趨勢 — 每一種都基於目前政治、經濟、國際格局的變數。

情境描述

1. 冷卻／局部降溫 — 維持緊張但避免全面對立
   經濟利益／貿易依存將促使雙方避免全面破裂。日本可能對部分敏感言論收斂，中國可能維持制裁但不進一步擴大。結果是：外交關係「降溫」，但仍有限度互動 — 特別是經濟與商業層面持續。
2. 維持僵持、循「政治-經濟分層」模式
   即使政治上對峙，經濟、民間交流（商業、旅遊、文化）可能部分恢復／持續，但官方與高層互動將受限。雙方關係長期冷淡，但不會完全崩壞。
3. 日方有限讓步（口頭／外交姿態）以換取緩和
   如果日本政府（或首相本人）認為外交與經濟成本過高，可能做出策略性「收斂」，透過外交聲明、降低對台言論強度、局部妥協等手段，為雙邊關係降溫。
4. 中方持續施壓 — 擴大反制／制度化「懲罰機制」
   若北京認為日本言論觸及其核心利益（尤其台灣／主權議題）過深，可能將制裁、限制常態化，甚至對日方企業、投資、文化交流採取更嚴重行動，使雙方關係進入「長期敵對／制衡」模式。
5. 受第三方／國際局勢影響 — 出現和解或重置
   若 United States、France、或其他國際大國扮演調停或施壓角色，又或亞洲整體安全／經濟格局變化（例如區域安全協議、經濟合作重組），可能出現新一輪外交斡旋，使中日關係重置或回到「預衝突但穩定」狀態。

🧮 哪些因素最關鍵？
• 政治與言論的「底線」：對北京而言，台灣議題觸及核心主權；只要日本再有類似公開「干預」、「武力介入」言論，衝突就可能再起。若日本收斂言論，是降溫的前提。 
• 經濟／貿易互賴：經歷多年貿易、投資與供應鏈合作，中日雙方都從對方經濟中獲益。這種互賴是緩和衝突、避免極端對立的重要動力。 
• 國際大國角色與區域安全格局：外部勢力（如美國、歐洲國家）對亞洲安全與台海議題的立場與動作，可能嚴重影響中日互動，也可能成為斡旋／壓力來源。 
• 國內政治壓力與輿論：無論是日本還是中國，政府都要考慮國內輿論與民族情緒。如果國內支持反制或強硬立場，也可能使妥協更困難。 

🎯 我傾向的「最可能收場」：政治冷、經濟熱 + 長期僵持

綜合上述，我認為最可能的結果是一種「冷卻但僵持」——既不會真正破裂，也不會迅速和解。具體來說：
• 雙方都不會輕易回到像 2023-2024 年那樣正常且密切的互動關係。
• 經濟／貿易／商業層面可能部分恢復或維持，但官方交流、政治／安全合作將大幅減少。
• 中日關係進入一種「新常態」：敏感議題迴避、低調互動，但不排除出現突發外交或經濟摩擦。

✅ 還有哪些「轉捩點」／關鍵觀察指標值得留意

如果你我往後要判斷衝突是否終結／升級，可以特別關注這些信號：
• 日本或高層是否針對「台灣有事／集體自衛權」的言論明確收斂或重申克制。
• 中國是否解除對日本水產品、旅遊、文化交流的限制；是否恢復或擴大與日本的交流。
• 美、歐或區域其他國家是否介入斡旋、發布安全倡議，或影響台海局勢。
• 雙方經濟數據、投資／貿易流量是否顯著受衝突影響 — 若依賴程度削弱，可能促使更快和解。

Video: A star-studded chorus performed “True Heroes” as a tribute to the HK firefighters who battled the blaze at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po. 群星合唱《真的英雄》獻予向參與撲救大埔宏福苑火災的香港消防員致敬.

https://rumble.com/v72kpza-true-heroes-as-a-tribute-to-the-hk-firefighters-who-battled-the-blaze-at-wa.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP8UXMsC1/

We wish everyone a safe return home. Stay strong. The Grade 5 fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po has touched the hearts of countless citizens, with people contributing money and effort across races for days, embodying the Lion Rock Spirit.

願各位平安歸家. 加油. 大埔宏福苑5級火災 牽動無數市民的心，連日出錢出力不分種族發揮獅子山精神.

American logistic expert report from China video: More US farm in troubles: Global fertilizer markets seize up after China, Russia keep theirs at home 美國物流專家從中國報導視訊有中文字幕: 更多美國農場陷入困境：中俄限制化肥出口導致全球市場緊縮

https://rumble.com/v72jzq8-more-us-farm-in-troubles.html
https://www.tiktok.com/t/ZP8UCyucY/

Fertilizer prices are soaring again, after Chinese and Russian suppliers sharply reduce exports.

Both are top producers of fertilizers, and previously supplied export markets. But China is locking up its supplies for its surging domestic market, as well as for its factory sector.

Russian fertilizers are now under sanction by the European Union, and farmers in the Eurozone are struggling to find suppliers elsewhere across the world. Since 2022, Russian exports of fertilizers are down over 80%.

American farmers are not nearly as reliant on imported fertilizers. But the shortages caused by Chinese and Russian export policy are pushing up prices by double-digits, even on US farms, as domestic fertilizers suppliers can freely raise prices to meet new market demand from Europe.

Closing scene, Xinjiang

隨著中國與俄羅斯供應商大幅削減少出口，化肥價格再度飆升。這兩國同為化肥生產大國，過去長期供應國際市場。但中國現正將化肥資源轉向蓬勃發展的國內市場及工業領域。

俄羅斯化肥目前受到歐盟制裁，歐元區農民正竭力在全球尋找替代供應源。自2022年以來，俄羅斯化肥出口量已下降逾80%。

美國農戶對進口化肥的依賴程度相對較低。但中俄出口政策導致的短缺問題，仍使美國農場的化肥價格出現兩位數增長——由於歐洲需求轉向，美國本土供應商得以自由提價以應對新增市場需求。

Johnson Choi Looking back and forward 蔡永強思前想後 Dec 3 2025

1974 to 1980, I studied hotel and restaurant management at the University of Hawaii, later pursuing an MBA degree. During that time, I held two jobs simultaneously: one as an Assistant Food & Beverage Manager at the Lobster House Restaurant in Hilton Hawaiian Village, and the other as an assistant manager and waiter at Maple Garden Restaurant. I was taking 21 credit hours per semester, averaging only four hours of sleep per day! At Hilton, the job offered reputation but little financial gain—a monthly salary of just one thousand dollars for 50 hours of work per week. Meanwhile, at Maple Garden, working four hours each night, I earned around eighty dollars in tips, totaling over two thousand dollars per month, all tax-free! Back then, a house cost only twenty-five thousand dollars, and I could have bought two or three—each of which is now worth two million dollars. Some of my classmates worked as waiters at the French restaurant Michelle, where they averaged 200 to 300 dollars in tips per night!

As a waiter, I detested the “tip pooling” system. Because I worked quickly, I could handle 5 to 8 tables at once, with a high turnover rate. When tips weren’t pooled, I often earned over a hundred dollars in a single night. In the 1970s, a hundred dollars was a significant amount of money! Whenever the boss was short-staffed, they would always call on me.

I have two major regrets in life: first, not using the money I earned to buy property; second, foolishly—extremely foolishly—choosing to stay in the United States!

In the 1970s, Hong Kong was more advanced than the United States, while mainland China lagged behind. Therefore, it was understandable for people from mainland China to aspire to come to the United States back then. But today, China’s development surpasses that of the United States tenfold, yet some are still willing to spend 500,000 to one million dollars to buy a U.S. passport! Your children will inevitably abandon their ancestral roots and forget their heritage—is it truly worth it?

Thirty years east of the river, thirty years west of the river. The next three hundred years will undoubtedly be an era dominated by the Chinese nation. As descendants of the Chinese people, we should take immense pride in this!

我於1974至1980年間在夏威夷大學攻讀酒店與餐廳管理，隨後進修MBA學位。期間同時從事兩份工作：一是在希爾頓夏威夷度假村的龍蝦餐廳擔任餐飲副理，另一是在楓園餐廳兼任副理與服務員。當時我每學期修讀21個學分，平均每天只睡四小時！在希爾頓的工作有名無利，月薪僅一千美元，每週工時長達50小時；而在楓林閣餐廳，每晚工作四小時便能賺取約八十美元小費，月入超過兩千且完全免稅！那時一棟房子僅需二萬五千美元，我本有機會購入兩三棟——如今每棟價值已達二百萬美元。我有些同學在法國餐廳Michelle擔任服務員，每晚小費平均有200至300美元！

當服務員時，我最反感「均分小費」的制度。因為我動作快，能同時照應5至8張餐桌，翻桌率高，若不參與分帳，一晚常能賺取百元以上小費。在1970年代，一百美元可是筆可觀的數目！當時只要老闆人手不足，必定會找我幫忙。

人生有兩大憾事：一是未能將所賺的錢用於購置房產；二是愚鈍至極，竟選擇留在美國！

1970年代，香港的繁榮程度勝過美國，中國大陸則相對落後。因此那時大陸同胞嚮往美國是可以理解的。但如今中國的發展已領先美國十倍，竟還有人願花費50萬至100萬美元購買一本美國護照！你們的子女將來也難免背棄祖源、忘卻根本——這真的值得嗎？

三十年河東，三十年河西。未來三百年，必將是中華民族主導的時代。身為炎黃子孫，我們應當為此深感自豪！